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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report has been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/106, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report on the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit as soon as possible after its convocation in Istanbul, Turkey, on 23 and 24 May 2016. The report provides an analysis of the priority themes that emerged from the Summit and concludes with recommendations for advancing the initiatives launched and commitments made at the Summit and, more broadly, in the Agenda for Humanity.

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I. Introduction

1. On 23 and 24 May 2016, I convened the first World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey: the first time in the history of the United Nations that representatives of Member States, non-governmental organizations, civil society, populations affected by crises, the private sector and international organizations came together on such a significant scale, with so many stakeholders, to commit to collectively and individually reduce the unprecedented level of humanitarian need and suffering in the world today.

2. I want to express my gratitude to the Government and people of Turkey for hosting the World Summit and for their substantive contribution to making it a success, as well as to the 9,000 people who participated, including the 180 Member States, two-thirds of which were represented at ministerial-level or above, including 55 Heads of State and Government, and the 23,000 people who engaged in the three-year consultation process leading to the convening of the Summit.

3. The extensive consultation process, the multi-stakeholder nature of the World Summit and the scale of participation made it unique in both substance and format. Among the different voices and perspectives present at the Summit, I witnessed Government representatives sitting together with members of resilient communities; multilateral development banks coming together to increase investment in fragile situations; and the private sector developing strategic partnerships with international organizations. The Summit reflected the potential behind the Charter of the United Nations, "We the peoples", channelling the humanitarian spirit towards collective solutions to shared responsibilities.

4. As elaborated in my report for the World Summit, "One humanity: shared responsibility",[1] it came at a time of skyrocketing humanitarian needs alongside a historic shortfall in the funding required to meet them. Armed conflicts and other violent situations, disasters caused by natural hazards and the impacts of climate change, health threats, soaring inequality and increased fragility marked by extreme poverty and weak institutions are among the factors contributing to the unprecedented spike in humanitarian needs.

5. The Agenda for Humanity and the five core responsibilities[2] presented in my report sought to demonstrate that addressing people's humanitarian needs requires more than increasing levels of assistance. It necessitates a far more decisive and deliberate effort to reduce needs, anchored in political will and leadership to prevent and end conflict, as well as a determined effort across humanitarian, development, human rights and peace and security to save lives, meet humanitarian needs and reduce risk and vulnerability.

6. The World Summit was successful in confirming the urgency and scale of the task ahead of us and in affirming that a new and coherent approach for reducing needs was required. I thank the participants, including the many Heads of State and Government, who welcomed the Agenda for Humanity and its five core

[1] A/70/709.

[2] Ibid., annex: core responsibility one: political leadership to prevent and end conflicts; core responsibility two: uphold the norms that safeguard humanity; core responsibility three: leave no one behind; core responsibility four: change people's lives: from delivering aid to ending need; and core responsibility five: invest in humanity.

responsibilities, and who recognized that it provides a critical framework that should be taken forward as a contribution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and our collective pledge to leave no one behind.

7. The World Summit has set in motion a multi-year agenda for change and transformation. Through the core commitments that many participants have aligned with, the initiatives launched and the thousands of individual commitments made, there was a groundswell of support for major changes in approach that will have a lasting impact. Stakeholders must remain active champions of the commitments they have made.

8. Local actors now expect greater recognition for their leading role in crisis prevention, preparedness and response, and to be consulted, supported and funded accordingly. People displaced within and across borders and others affected by crises should benefit from a concerted effort by the international community, not only to meet their humanitarian needs, but also to systematically reduce those needs and to increase their protection and resilience. Women and women's groups expect to be more empowered and better resourced in order to participate and lead in building community resilience, humanitarian response and peacebuilding, and to have their specific needs and rights met in crises. As a result, children, young people, persons with disabilities, older people and other groups that are uniquely vulnerable in crises will be included to a greater degree in decision-making and will benefit from more targeted financing.[3]

9. The World Summit has also reaffirmed the value of convening a diversity of stakeholders to develop solutions to shared problems. Only by harnessing the skills and ideas of a diverse range of stakeholders will we be able to respond to the magnitude of the challenges and implement changes on the scale required. Participants in the Summit recognized the leading role of civil society, and embraced it, along with the private sector, as genuine strategic partners, rather than simply as stakeholders to be consulted or as providers of resources. The United Nations is an organization of 193 Member States, but it must also be the forum where different voices, ideas and ambitions come together.

10. The World Summit also highlighted the struggle to secure meaningful commitment to change in the areas that would have the most impact on saving lives, ending people's suffering and safeguarding their dignity. Despite the many affirmations of support for preventing and ending conflict and respecting international law, the few new and concrete commitments that would lead to change on the ground reveal the complexity of the task and the political environment we face today. Without decisive political leadership from Member States and global leaders to connect words to action, people affected by crises will continue to suffer and will be deprived of life-saving assistance. This remains the international community's greatest task and challenge.

11. The purpose of the present report is to highlight some of the priority areas that emerged from the World Summit and to identify means of advancing the Agenda for

[3] The report is complemented by the "Commitments to Action" document (see www.worldhumanitariansummit.org), which provides analysis of the types of commitments made in support of the Agenda for Humanity and the number and examples of initiatives launched. The document will also be made available to the public on the online Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation, discussed in paras. 58 and 59 below, in the coming months.

Humanity over the coming years. The report will provide a sense of direction, but will not include details on the specific mechanisms or processes for individual initiatives to be implemented.

12. The United Nations is uniquely positioned to facilitate and steer this process, but it will take political will, a steadfast commitment to change and a diversity of actors working in collaboration if we are to succeed. The ultimate success of the World Summit, whether it improves the lives of those in Aleppo in the Syrian Arab Republic or in Bangui in the Central African Republic, the islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, communities crippled by El Niño and the drought in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa or the displaced in camps in the Sudan or the Middle East, lies with Governments, communities affected by crises, civil society, international and regional organizations and the United Nations.

II. World Humanitarian Summit: a point of departure

13. Over two days in Istanbul, participants at the World Summit gathered to express their commitment to take responsibility for placing people at the centre of decision-making and action. World leaders came together in the leaders segment to reaffirm that our common problems need common solutions and greater international cooperation, underscoring their responsibility to: reduce and end conflicts through prevention and political solutions; provide greater investment in peaceful and inclusive societies; uphold and champion international humanitarian and human rights law; reach those who are furthest behind, including by reducing displacement and empowering and protecting women and girls; undertake a new way of working that not only meets people's needs but reduces their risks and vulnerability; and acknowledge the need for sustained political and financial resources.

14. At a series of seven high-level round tables, senior Government representatives and representatives of civil society and the private sector aligned themselves with 32 core commitments[4] prepared in advance of the World Summit and in support of the Agenda for Humanity, and made concrete policy, legal and operational commitments to advance them. At 15 special sessions, new initiatives and alliances were launched; at 132 side events, representatives of Member States, international, national and regional organizations, affected populations, non-governmental organizations, diaspora communities, faith-based organizations, the private sector, academia and others discussed current and emerging challenges, shared good practices and formed new partnerships; and the world's best technological partners and innovators participated in an innovation fair on cutting-edge solutions. Multiple special events, from musical performances to photographic displays and films, showcased stories of people's resilience, humanity and dignity.

[4] Participants at the World Humanitarian Summit were invited to express their alignment with the 32 core commitments developed in support of the seven high-level round tables. The report reflects those alignments registered through the World Summit online commitments platform or by e-mail up until 4 June 2016.

Priority trends emerging from the World Summit

A. Protecting civilians and minimizing human suffering

(Advancing core responsibilities one and two)

Conflict prevention and investment in fragile situations

15. The World Summit confirmed that preventing and ending conflict, including through addressing root causes, is the most important and effective way to substantially reduce risk, vulnerability and humanitarian needs for protection and assistance.

16. To demonstrate necessary political leadership, some Member States committed themselves to increase investment in early warning analysis, including of human rights violations, and to defuse risks before they deteriorate. Others committed to use membership in the Security Council to advocate for greater focus and briefings on emerging conflict risks or to establish a contact group at the onset of a crisis. A number of Member States committed to share good practices on conflict prevention, to increase staffing and to provide other forms of support for conflict mediation, prevention and resolution.

17. Over 85 entities, including 40 Member States, aligned with one or more of the core commitments on political leadership to prevent and end conflict, with the highest number on addressing the root causes of conflict and reducing fragility by investing in inclusive, peaceful societies. Commitments were made to ensure that women can meaningfully engage and hold leadership positions in mediation and conflict prevention efforts. Commitments were also made to increase the role of youth in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including through national dialogues and sharing good practice. In a peace promise, 30 United Nations entities and civil society organizations also committed to address the drivers of conflicts and vulnerability in order to reduce subsequent humanitarian needs.

I would like to express my appreciation to those Heads of State and Government who showed personal leadership in this area at the World Summit. I urge Member States and other stakeholders to redouble efforts to address root causes and encourage those who made commitments and affirmations in this area to now translate their support into specific, time-bound commitments and to periodically assess progress.

Despite the recognition at the World Summit of the importance of greater attention to conflict prevention and resolution, the relatively low number of individual commitments to this core responsibility demonstrates that prevention and conflict resolution remain a laudable ambition rather than a concrete and operational activity that is adequately equipped, financed and championed. This must change. Without much greater political leadership from Member States to prevent and resolve conflicts and to increase stability, we will not be able to substantially reduce the scale of humanitarian needs or the unprecedented movement of people within and across borders.

International humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law

18. The World Summit affirmed that compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law is critical to saving lives, reducing suffering and safeguarding human dignity during and after conflict and in other situations of violence. The Summit recognized that far more has to be done to end and prevent violations, including through improved compliance and greater accountability for violations.

19. Almost 110 entities, including 41 Member States, aligned with one or more of the core commitments on upholding the norms that safeguard humanity, with the highest number on promoting and enhancing respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. The importance of adhering to international humanitarian law was also echoed at the World Summit, including in a joint statement endorsed by 49 Member States. A joint commitment was also made by a group of Member States to minimize the impact on civilians of explosive weapons in populated areas. Some Member States and other stakeholders committed to strengthen humanitarian mine action and to promote ratification of and accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

20. Commitments were made to continue to monitor, investigate, analyse and report on international human rights and international humanitarian law violations and abuses. Specific commitments were made to disseminate, offer training and promote compliance with these bodies of law. Other commitments focused on improving the protection of humanitarian and health-care workers, health-care facilities, schools and other civilian infrastructure. Faith-based organizations committed to use their networks to raise awareness for compliance with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles. A wide range of stakeholders committed themselves to put humanitarian principles at the centre of their work and underlined the importance of the principles as part of their commitments to advance the core responsibilities.

21. Measures to track, collect data and report on violations of international humanitarian law were also announced. A number of Member States made commitments to support and promote cooperation with the International Criminal Court. Nearly 20 per cent of the individual commitments related to this core responsibility were focused on the prevention of gender-based violence.

The strong support of Member States for promoting and enhancing respect for international humanitarian, human rights, refugee law and humanitarian principles is timely and important. However, concerted effort is required at national, regional and global levels to ensure that civilians are in fact receiving assistance and being protected in and after conflicts such as those being witnessed at the present time. I call on all parties to armed conflict to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access. I further call on Member States, non-State armed groups and humanitarian organizations to ensure full respect for humanitarian principles.

Political and economic leverage should be exercised and legal mechanisms utilized to ensure that parties to armed conflict comply with their obligations under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and that accountability is ensured for violations. I also reiterate my call for a vigorous global campaign to mobilize States, civil society and

global leaders to enhance respect for international humanitarian and human rights law.

B. Leave no one behind

(Advancing core responsibility three)

22. From the statements made by leaders to the concrete commitments made, the World Summit was unequivocal in confirming the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The pledge to leave no one behind demands that greater political, financial and operational investments be made to ensure that immediate humanitarian needs are met, but also that humanitarian needs, risk and vulnerability are reduced over time.

Reducing forced displacement

23. The World Summit affirmed that forced displacement is not only a humanitarian challenge, but also a political, development and human rights one. The Summit proved instrumental to building consensus for a new comprehensive approach to addressing forced displacement based on meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees and internally displaced persons, protecting their rights and providing greater support for sustained livelihoods and for strengthening the capacities and resilience of the displaced and host communities. Such an approach must go hand-in-hand with political action and legal frameworks to address the root causes of forced displacement and efforts to find longer-term durable solutions.

24. One hundred entities, including 38 Member States, aligned themselves with one or more of the core commitments on addressing forced displacement. The highest numbers of alignments were in support of the new approach, followed by the commitment to promote safe and durable solutions and to take the necessary steps to work towards a target of a 50 per cent reduction in the number of those internally displaced by 2030. Specific commitments were made by some Member States to integrate refugees and internally displaced persons into national and local development plans, including access to education, livelihoods, social protection and social services. The United Nations, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector made commitments to support national efforts to strengthen legal and policy frameworks to protect internally displaced persons and uphold their rights and to meet the short- and long-term needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities.

25. In recognition of the need to address large movements of refugees in a more comprehensive manner, a number of Member States reaffirmed their commitment to continue hosting refugees, in line with their international obligations. Several Member States announced their intention to resettle more refugees in 2016. Numerous financial commitments were made by multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, bilateral donors and other financial partners to provide predictable financing and strengthen the capacities of host communities, in recognition of the public good they provide as well as the financial implications of that obligation. In addition, seven multilateral development banks agreed to collaborate in response to the refugee and migrant crisis.

26. Widespread recognition of the growing number of people displaced by disasters and climate change also led to the launch of a Platform on Disaster Displacement by a group of Member States. The Platform is intended to prevent and prepare for displacement due to natural disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change.

27. In recognition of the increase in mixed flows of refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants, a number of commitments were also made at the World Summit to address the particular vulnerabilities migrants can face. Some Member States made the commitment to increase access for migrants to labour markets and social services, strengthening coping capacity and self-reliance. Others committed to improve protection through birth registration of children of migrants or by strengthening legal or policy frameworks.

I call on Member States, United Nations agencies and other stakeholders to collectively increase protection and assistance to internally displaced persons and to support effective policies and frameworks that reduce new and protracted situations of internal displacement in a safe and dignified manner, with the aim of reducing the number of people who are internally displaced by at least 50 per cent globally by 2030. I further encourage collaborative approaches between humanitarian and development actors that transition displaced persons from dependency on aid towards increased resilience and self-reliance.

I encourage Member States and humanitarian and development organizations to continue to ensure that the particular vulnerabilities of migrants in countries of origin, transit and destination are addressed, including through protection and assistance, and by enabling migrants to become contributing members of society in countries of arrival.

The next critical milestone related to refugees, migrants and host communities will be the 19 September 2016 high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, at which Heads of States and Government will agree on commitments that will significantly improve the lives of refugees and migrants.

Women and girls as agents of change

28. The World Summit confirmed that gender equality, fulfilment of women's and girls' human rights and their empowerment in political, humanitarian and development spheres is a universal responsibility. The skills and experience of women of all ages and their role as leaders and agents of change are pivotal to sustaining conflict prevention and resolution, to peacebuilding and to building resilient communities.

29. Governments, regional organizations and aid organizations committed themselves to gender equality and to support for women's leadership in decision-making. Nearly 100 entities, including 41 Member States, aligned with the core commitment to ensure that humanitarian programming is gender-responsive. Of the 32 core commitments, the commitment to women and girls received the highest number of alignments to a core commitment by Member States.

30. A number of Member States and other stakeholders put targets in place to increase resources for women's organizations, including those representing women with disabilities, to ensure women's participation and leadership roles in humanitarian response and peacebuilding and to align funding with principles of gender equality. New financing and programmes were pledged for women's and girls' education, training, livelihood support and access to quality, comprehensive sexual and reproductive health care. Governments committed themselves to undertake legislative reforms to ensure greater protection for women of all ages and girls from all forms of gender-based violence, no matter the setting.

I urge all stakeholders, in the implementation of their commitments, to ensure that they promote gender equality and uphold women's and girls' rights and that they develop and make publically available specific plans and concrete and time-bound targets to implement them. I call on all Member States to meet their obligation to protect and fulfil the human rights of women of all ages and call on all stakeholders to ensure that these rights are promoted at all times in the implementation of their commitments in all aspects of the Agenda for Humanity.

Inclusion

31. The World Summit affirmed that our responsibility to restore humanity and uphold the humanitarian principle of impartiality cannot be fulfilled unless the humanitarian needs and human rights of marginalized people and those at the greatest risk are at the forefront of our efforts to meet needs, uphold norms and reduce vulnerability.

32. Specific initiatives, funds and coalitions were launched to ensure that the needs of persons with disabilities, children and youth, migrants, older persons and other marginalized people will be fully taken into account in preparedness and response. The Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action will strengthen an inclusive approach to design, implementation, monitoring and funding of assistance. Through the Charter on Inclusion, more than 70 stakeholders made the commitment to implement measures to ensure that persons with disabilities have the right to full participation in and access to relief, protection and recovery programmes. A compact for young people in humanitarian action will help to ensure the needs of young people affected by crises are addressed and that they are meaningfully engaged in crisis prevention and response activities.

As with the other initiatives, I recommend that workplans and concrete benchmarks be put in place in support of inclusion-related commitments, and that regular reviews and evaluations take place to assess whether they are addressing the specific protection and assistance needs of marginalized groups, reducing their humanitarian needs and ensuring that their leadership and participation is actively supported and promoted. I propose that similar reviews and evaluations should take place on how youth are being meaningfully engaged in humanitarian action.

C. A new way of working

(Advancing core responsibilities three, four and five)

33. The consultations leading to the World Summit called for a new way of working that not only meets people's needs in a principled manner, but also reduces those needs by reducing people's risks and vulnerabilities.

34. Almost 120 entities, including 34 Member States and almost 60 non-governmental organizations, aligned themselves with the commitment to a "new way of working" that meets people's immediate humanitarian needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability over multiple years through the achievement of collective outcomes. More stakeholders aligned themselves with this core commitment than with any other core commitment. In addition, the shifts called for in core responsibility four of the Agenda for Humanity generated the highest number of individual commitments from all stakeholders.

35. The World Summit demonstrated strong momentum towards the new way of working, embodied by commitments to: reinforce local leadership and ownership; transcend the humanitarian-development divide while ensuring full respect for humanitarian principles; increase preparedness and risk-driven planning and programming; create diverse partnerships and alliances to tackle specific challenges; and provide coherent and aligned financing to enable these shifts.

National and local leadership and ownership

36. The World Summit marked a turning point in how national and local actors, including women and women's groups, should be engaged, capacitated and funded. The Summit also affirmed that people affected by crises or living in situations of risk are rights-holders who must be put at the centre of decision-making processes.

37. Widespread commitments were made from donors, international non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies to devolve leadership and decision-making to levels at closest proximity to crises. Targets were set to increase the amount of funding channelled to national and local responders and to strengthen local capacities. This included a commitment under the "grand bargain" initiative to channel 25 per cent of financing to national and local responders, as directly as possible, by 2020. Networks and alliances were also formed, such as the Charter4Change and the Network for Empowered Aid Response to support and ensure genuine local leadership and community engagement.

38. Numerous commitments were pledged to scale up cash-based programming and risk-informed social protection. Commitments were also made to put people at the centre of design, implementation and decision-making, such as the adoption of the Core Humanitarian Standard by more than 90 stakeholders. In addition, over 100 entities committed themselves to establish a common approach in order to provide information and to collect and analyse feedback from people affected by crises to influence decision-making processes.

I urge donors, international non-governmental organizations, national authorities and other stakeholders who made financing and capacity development commitments to make them time-bound and to conduct regular internal reviews on how they have succeeded in shifting leadership and implementation to national and local actors, where this is feasible,

and have improved accountability to people affected by crises. I also encourage networks such as those launched at the World Summit to promote and monitor progress in these areas.

Transcend the humanitarian-development divide

39. The World Summit culminated in a long-sought commitment to change the way that humanitarian and development actors work together.

40. In its Commitments to Action,[5] the United Nations pledged to strengthen its contribution to meeting needs, reducing vulnerabilities and improving risk management by working together with entities of the United Nations system and other entities towards collective outcomes over multi-year time frames, based on comparative advantage in each context. Some Member States, non-governmental organizations and international organizations committed to making internal reforms to improve joined-up humanitarian and development programming and financing, while others committed to flexible and multi-year financing to support collective outcomes.

41. A number of initiatives were also launched that support this new approach. The "Education Cannot Wait" fund will bring humanitarian and development communities together to increase the provision of education for children and young people in crises. The initiative on "putting health at the centre of collective humanitarian action" will support the short- and longer-term health outcomes of people in crises by improving access to essential health services, while at the same time promoting preparedness and response to outbreaks, strengthening health-care systems and preventing attacks on parties delivering healthcare.

We have committed to a new way of working, and now we must deliver on those commitments. Commitments should be quickly translated into practical, flexible and context-specific change in practice, while ensuring full respect for humanitarian principles. Policy and operational guidance should be rapidly developed, particularly in the areas of analysis, planning, coordination, leadership and financing. I urge all Member States to recognize the transformative impact that transcending the humanitarian-development divide can have on ensuring more resilient and inclusive communities and to lend their support to achieving it.

Risk and data-driven planning, programming and decision-making

42. The World Summit confirmed it was time to shift from reactively managing crises to proactively reducing risks and underscored that planning, financing and decision-making across conflict situations, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, response and recovery have to be underpinned by data and common risk analysis.

[5] The Commitments to Action, signed at the World Humanitarian Summit by the Secretary-General and eight United Nations entities (the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Population Fund and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), and endorsed by the World Bank and the International Organization of Migration (IOM), remains open to additional signatories.

43. To give effect to this change, a global risk analysis platform was launched at the World Summit. The platform will improve risk-based decision-making by synthesizing multi-hazard risk data and information. In this context, the United Nations also committed itself to ensure that all of its plans and programmes will be risk-informed, and private sector organizations committed to incentivize early action in order to minimize the impact of known risks and hazards. Member States, United Nations entities, the World Bank and private sector organizations pledged to increase risk financing and insurance for the most vulnerable, including through the Insurance Development Forum. Numerous commitments were also made by donors, United Nations agencies and other organizations to scale up the collection and use of sex-, age- and disability-disaggregated data as part of a risk-informed approach.

Commitments to improve shared multi-hazard risk analysis should be embedded in decision-making structures and should be evaluated to assess whether they influence subsequent actions. I encourage the close tracking of financial commitments and the documentation and sharing of the benefits of risk-insurance mechanisms to promote their use. Data, including sex-age-disability disaggregated data, must form the basis for the new way of working and must underpin decision-making.

Diverse partnerships and alliances

44. The World Summit launched new alliances, networks and initiatives to galvanize and cement new partnerships: the Global Alliance for Urban Crises will mobilize members to partner with urban institutions and communities to address risks and mitigate crisis impacts; and the Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation will match problems with people who might be able to solve them with new tools and insights. The capacities of regional organizations will be strengthened through the Regional Organizations Humanitarian Action Network. The Connecting Business Initiative will support, establish and strengthen private sector networks, nationally, regionally and thematically, and the Humanitarian Data Centre will increase collaboration between the private sector, academia, practitioners and policymakers to improve impact of data on humanitarian action.

I encourage strong leadership, robust action plans and clearly defined objectives for these new partnerships and alliances. Member States and other stakeholders should embrace and join these new initiatives, identifying where their interests, resources and expertise can best support them.

It is also important that the unique space offered by the World Humanitarian Summit to bring these diverse stakeholders together continue. I encourage Member States, United Nations organizations, regional groupings and other stakeholders to create opportunities for members of these initiatives to continue to come together and assess progress.

D. Disasters caused by natural hazards and climate change

(Advancing core responsibilities three, four and five)

45. The World Summit recognized the strong effect that disasters and climate-induced displacement have in terms of increasing humanitarian needs and security concerns, and affirmed that disaster response could not be isolated from broader development and climate-change adaptation efforts. The elements of the new way of working described above were also seen as critical to building community resilience and reducing risk and vulnerability related to natural hazards and climate change.

46. Over 105 entities, including 44 Member States, aligned with one or more of the core commitments on managing risks and crises differently. The core commitment to reinforce national and local leadership and capacities in managing disaster and climate-related risks received the highest number of alignments by Member States. Member States also made commitments to accelerate the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, accompanied by significant financial commitments to invest in disaster risk reduction and tackle climate change. Commitments were also made to strengthen the response to the security dimensions of climate change.

47. The Global Preparedness Partnership was launched to help an initial set of 20 of the most-at-risk countries achieve a minimum level of readiness to future shocks by 2020. Countries and regional organizations committed to strengthen regional, national and local risk analysis, crisis management capacities and resilience to climate change, and to better align regional and international offers of assistance with them. Other countries supported commitment of the World Customs Organization to facilitate the movement of relief personnel and the rapid clearance of relief goods.

48. The One Billion Coalition for Resilience will bring stakeholders together to support 1 billion people to strengthen community resilience over the next 10 years. Some Member States and the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board have made commitments to scale up shock-resistant social protection systems.

Regional and global partnerships should be quickly operationalized with workplans and benchmarks, and matched with resources. New guidance on transcending the humanitarian-development divide should be context specific and should consider how to reduce risk and vulnerability arising from disaster and climate change. Disaster-prone countries and small island developing States will need additional support to prepare for disasters and to mitigate disaster risks.

I also urge Member States to accelerate the implementation, financing of, and coherency between the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as other relevant programmes of action such as the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway.

E. Strengthening the resource base and increasing efficiency

(Advancing core responsibility five)

49. The World Summit confirmed that new resources and financial tools to meet unprecedented humanitarian needs and reduce needs, risk and vulnerability were required. This must be accompanied by more effective and more equitable use of resources to ensure that a greater portion of funding directly reaches communities.

50. The World Summit expanded the overall base of funding by attracting a more diverse group of donors and types of financing mechanisms. More than 100 entities, including 36 Member States, aligned with one or more of the core commitments related to financing. Pledges of new and additional funds for the Central Emergency Response Fund were made and will help to achieve an increase in the Fund to $1 billion by 2018. The Global Islamic Finance and Impact Investing Platform and numerous other Islamic finance initiatives will expand the financing base for crisis-affected people. The global crisis response platform, soon to be operationalized by the World Bank, will also provide resources for risk mitigation and crisis response to low- and middle-income countries, with an emphasis on those hosting refugees.

51. The cornerstone of commitments to increase efficiency was the "grand bargain", an agreement drawing together donors, United Nations entities, IOM, a national and international consortium of non-governmental organizations and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to incrementally deliver efficiency gains of up to a billion dollars per year over five years, including reducing earmarked and increasing multi-year financing.

52. The World Summit also confirmed cash-based programming and more direct funding to local actors as critical operational measures for increasing efficiency, supporting people's agency and stimulating local economies. Commitments were made by several donors and implementing partners to increase the percentage of cash-based assistance, and targets were set to increase funding directly to local responders. Several private sector actors announced improved security and the standardization of digital payments.

> **The world has never been so wealthy, and yet the lack of available resources is constantly putting our ability to save lives and reduce suffering at risk. Flexible and unearmarked funding from diverse sources for protection and humanitarian assistance remains insufficient, creating an unacceptable gap. I urge that financial commitments be fulfilled and urge all Member States and other stakeholders to increase predictable, flexible and multi-year support to humanitarian appeals, the Central Emergency Response Fund and country-based pooled funds. Financial and political support to new financing platforms that aim to reduce risk and vulnerability in protracted and fragile settings are also critical. In addition, I also encourage initiatives on efficiency, including on strategic cash-based programming and support to local responders, and the adoption of clear benchmarks and reporting frameworks to speed implementation and promote accountability.**

III. Advancing the Agenda for Humanity

53. The World Summit was a point of departure and served as an accelerator in our collective path to prevent and manage crises differently. The key outcomes noted above illustrate some of the most significant themes that emerged, but the Agenda for Humanity should be advanced as a whole.

54. Progress in this regard will rely on the leadership and initiative of a range of stakeholders that made the World Summit a success. We will all need to make individual contributions within our respective capacity and comparative advantages. It is not for the United Nations or any other single entity to deliver alone, neither in terms of responsibility nor capacity.

55. The following section offers a simple road map for reporting on and advancing the Agenda for Humanity and related commitments — both those made at the World Summit and those still to come. It includes four elements: (a) documenting and reporting on existing and forthcoming commitments; (b) reporting annually on progress; (c) taking stock of achievements and transformation; and (d) engaging in continued dialogue and outreach.

56. The milestones and tools listed are by no means exhaustive. All stakeholders must maintain momentum on the Agenda for Humanity in ways that reflect their own expertise and areas of influence.

A. Documenting and reporting on commitments

57. Thousands of commitments to advance the Agenda for Humanity were announced at the World Summit.[6] As a guiding approach, the primary responsibility for championing, implementing and reporting on commitments is with those who have made them.

58. However, there is also a need to sustain the spirit of collaboration demonstrated at the World Summit and to ensure continued progress. This will require a shared hub for collaboration, the sharing of good practices and other dynamic forms of engagement. An online Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation will be established to enable ongoing engagement and to offer guidance on making new commitments. The Platform will also serve as the main sources of information to analyse and report on progress, and will also:

(a) Serve as a transparency tool by publicly displaying all individual and collective commitments, alignments with core commitments and initiatives related to the Agenda for Humanity;

(b) Be based on self-reporting, and will track continued progress by enabling any stakeholders to observe commitments and progress made by others: it will be interactive, allowing users to search commitments and analyse trends;

[6] Figures referring to individual commitments include those registered by stakeholders on the online commitment platform of the World Summit or submitted to the secretariat of the Summit by e-mail up until 15 July 2016. The process of verifying individual commitments with stakeholders is ongoing. This number does not include verbal commitments expressed at the Summit.

(c) Serve as platform for continued engagement with the Agenda for Humanity: it will be a dynamic space for showcasing and catalysing new partnerships and collaborations;

(d) Include a record of the Summit itself, inter alia, statements, declarations and outcome documents from the various forums held at the Summit.

59. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will be responsible for the development of the Platform in order to ensure that it can deliver these core functions, in collaboration with relevant partners. Support from Member States and other stakeholders will be needed in the form of resources, expertise and active participation.

B. Reporting on progress: annual synthesis report

60. In order to honour the call for significant change that emerged from the World Summit, we must periodically assess progress and identify areas where it may be lagging. As one contribution to this assessment, an annual synthesis report will be prepared.

61. The synthesis report will be based on self-reporting provided on the Platform as well as targeted follow-up. I have requested the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to coordinate the preparation of the report. The report will draw from the Platform and other relevant sources of information, and will also reflect emerging research. The report will complement reports of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

62. The synthesis report may be supported by an annual survey or similar outreach to provide a range of regional and stakeholder perspectives. Reporting should draw upon the growing use of common feedback mechanisms that provide direct input from affected communities.

63. Reporting should be informed by submission of thematic or other analysis on specific areas of focus from the World Summit, such as: cash-based programming; data-sharing and analysis; or some of the many other cross-cutting issues. This kind of analysis from bodies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, civil society, the scientific and academic community and others can enrich individual reporting.

64. Some aspects of the Agenda for Humanity are reliant solely or primarily on a single stakeholder group, including Member States, donors or first responders. The use and sharing of peer reviews is an important tool for sharing good practices and overcoming shared challenges.

C. Assessing achievements and transformation: taking stock of progress

65. Any point of departure and acceleration should naturally have a point of arrival — a point for determining whether the desired change and transformation has taken hold. The overall measure of progress will be whether fewer people are caught in conflict, crises and situations of risk and vulnerability, and whether the most vulnerable have benefited from progress made in delivering the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

66. A high-level stocktaking meeting within the next three to five years will be necessary to assess overall progress and to identify shortcomings that require our further attention. Such an exercise could take into account progress reported through the online Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation, annual reports and developments in intergovernmental, inter-agency and other forums, and could draw on initiatives at the regional, national and local levels.

D. Furthering dialogue and engagement

67. The engagement and dialogue throughout the World Summit process provided new opportunities to reflect on shared challenges and to collectively advance initiatives that might otherwise have remained isolated. For some Member States and other stakeholders, time did not allow for the adoption of commitments that reflected their level of interest in advance of the Summit. Follow-up to the Summit must therefore offer opportunities for dialogue in support of additional commitments and broadened support for those announced interest at the Summit. Below are examples of some of the relevant international, regional, national, and cross-cutting forums for doing so.

1. International forums

Intergovernmental

68. I encourage Member States to engage in continued dialogue on key issues emanating from the World Summit, using all relevant channels available through intergovernmental processes, including through relevant General Assembly and Economic and Social Council forums and resolutions, such as the annual strengthening the coordination of United Nations emergency humanitarian assistance resolutions. Through dialogue during the Council's humanitarian affairs segment, Member States have an opportunity to discuss progress and challenges in advancing their commitments to relevant aspects of the Agenda for Humanity. Moreover, enhanced dialogue between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission to promote coherence and complementarity among humanitarian, development and peace and security actors, as requested by the Assembly in its resolution 70/262 and by the Security Council in its resolution 2282 (2015), can also play an important role.

69. The General Assembly offers an opportunity for continued dialogue that more deliberately links the humanitarian agenda to the broader global agendas, including during the annual general debate. I also encourage dialogue associated with the high-level political forum on sustainable development to consider the contributions of Member States and stakeholders to reducing overall humanitarian needs.

70. Many of the issues in the Agenda for Humanity, particularly those regarding the protection of civilians and international humanitarian law, will be of concern to the Security Council. In particular, the Agenda for Humanity calls for increased efforts to report on allegations of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and increased situational awareness on possible emerging crises and conflicts. Through my office, as well as relevant special representatives, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and other principal United Nations actors, I will endeavour to keep the Council apprised of progress and challenges related to these issues. In addition, I welcome the emphasis that Member States have placed on the

intention of the Security Council to request specific, strategic and targeted advice from the Peacebuilding Commission and the desire for the Commission to advise and convene the entities of the system to sustain peace.

71. The Human Rights Council also offers an important role in advancing the Agenda for Humanity, in particular by addressing human rights violations and abuses that serve as early warnings for large-scale future crises and conflicts. International human rights mechanisms, including the human rights treaty bodies, the special procedures and the universal periodic review process, provide significant tools to further the human rights aspects of the Agenda for Humanity. I continue to attach importance to the annual meetings of States parties to international humanitarian and human rights legal instruments that further the respect of international law and advance the Agenda for Humanity.

72. Through continued partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank, we will remain engaged in further dialogue on the role of new and existing financial instruments relevant to the Agenda for Humanity. I also welcome continued engagement with other international financial institutions and regional banks, which showed tremendous leadership at the World Summit. The annual meeting of the World Bank and the meetings of its Development Committee offer important opportunities to assess progress in these areas.

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

73. Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement provided substantive guidance and engagement for the organization and conduct of the World Summit at all levels. On issues such as upholding international humanitarian law, locally-led prevention and response, resilience-building, the safety of health-care workers and many other themes, the role of the International Movement spans policy development and the delivery of humanitarian action. In particular, the quadrennial International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent has been a critical forum for the development of and respect for international humanitarian law and other issues of central concern to the humanitarian community for many years. As such, the it offers an opportunity to carry forward discussions linked to or drawing from the Agenda for Humanity that are relevant to the core mission of the International Movement.

International multi-stakeholder forums

74. Other international forums, such as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding also made significant contributions to the World Summit, including the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World. Meetings of the International Dialogue, publications and peer reviews of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development also offer important tools to further those commitments.

75. There are many non-governmental, government-led and United Nations forums that draw together multiple stakeholders to discuss policy and practice, and these will be critical to advancing the Agenda for Humanity. One example, from within the United Nations system, is the Global Humanitarian Policy Forum, convened by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which can be used as a forum to highlight and measure progress on key priorities and initiatives

and link to other global change agendas. This and other forums that reach across stakeholder groups must continue to benefit from broad participation and support.

Inter-agency forums

76. Many commitments announced at the World Summit emerged from the United Nations and its governing bodies. In the remainder of my tenure as Secretary-General, I will continue to lead the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination in discussing and advancing "whole-of-United Nations" positions and issues of relevance for the Organization and its partners that advance the Agenda for Humanity. In some areas, broad policy agreement has already been achieved and must now be turned into operational guidance through relevant bodies, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the United Nations Development Group and their respective working groups.

2. Regional forums and groupings

Regional organizations and groupings

77. Member State groupings at the regional level played an important role in catalysing action and developing common positions that advance different aspects of the Agenda for Humanity. For example, the Common African Position on Humanitarian Effectiveness launched by the African Union earlier in 2016, and the new partnership forged between the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and the Islamic Development Bank, as well as broad-based policy initiatives spearheaded by the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, can produce transformative results. I encourage the continued efforts of these and other regional groupings, as well as the new Regional Organizations Humanitarian Action Network, to support Member States in taking these commitments forward.

Regional steering groups

78. As part of the consultation process for the holding of the World Humanitarian Summit, regional steering groups worked to ensure that the Summit would reflect the diverse contexts that shape humanitarian needs. I strongly encourage the sustained use of these informal groups to maintain diverse forms of engagement and to increase awareness of the Agenda for Humanity.

3. National and local forums

79. The impact of the Agenda for Humanity must ultimately be felt at the national and local levels, where Member States have the primary responsibility to prevent and respond to crises. I strongly encourage the continued use of the appropriate national processes that were important leading up to the World Summit, such as parliamentary dialogues, national policy reviews and awareness-raising efforts. Local forums for engagement also continue to be important in recognizing local leadership and capacity and clarifying needs and priorities through community engagement.

80. Through the United Nations system at the national level, I encourage resident and humanitarian coordinators, humanitarian country teams and United Nations country teams to support Member States as they implement their commitments. This

may include: the provision of technical guidance; the sharing of good practices; or the convening of dialogues across stakeholder groups to broaden partnerships.

4. Cross-cutting networks and forums

81. Many stakeholder groups and forums for engagement have an impact across national, regional and international levels: a number of such groups and forums are listed below as possible channels for advancing the Agenda for Humanity.

Civil society engagement and dialogue

82. Among the most forward-looking commitments at the World Summit were those made by non-governmental organizations, including the establishment of new standards, charters and platforms. In addition to the frontline delivery of humanitarian assistance, civil society actors have been particularly vocal on issues of accountability, protecting rights and ensuring that results for crisis-affected people are at the centre of all of our efforts. Civil society, such as international and local non-governmental organizations, as well as faith-based groups, diaspora and migrant communities and others, must continue to fulfil their critical role in providing leadership, service delivery, advocacy and outreach, including through engagement with affected communities.

Private sector networks

83. Private sector engagement was integrated throughout the World Summit, with participants recognizing the strategic role of the private sector beyond financing, including by drawing upon core competencies; building community resilience; and helping to restore economies and livelihoods. I applaud the important initiatives and commitments launched by the private sector at the Summit and I encourage Member States and others to continue to collaborate with private sector partners and to take full advantage of their expertise and capacities, including through the Connecting Business Initiative. I urge businesses to report on their progress using the Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation and their own channels for information-sharing.

Research and evidence development

84. Numerous academic, research organizations and think tanks contributed to the research and evidence base that underpinned the Agenda for Humanity. I encourage academic and research institutions to continue to work to strengthen the evidence base for assessing progress on the Agenda for Humanity to illustrate where commitments and initiatives are having an impact, where gaps in data exist and how to adapt progress measurements to different contexts. Resulting research and analysis in this area could be presented on the Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation and as a contribution to the annual synthesis report.

Global advocacy and outreach

85. In order to maintain the inclusive and broad reaching nature of the process adopted at the World Summit, I call on all stakeholders to share highlights and personal stories about progress, good practices and key challenges in advancing the Agenda for Humanity. Advocacy and outreach campaigns, including through traditional and new media, will be important for continued engagement. The

Summit also recognized that global advocates at all levels, from Heads of State to community leaders, play a critical role in framing the urgency of our shared challenges in their own circles of influence. I encourage efforts by those advocates to translate their critical roles so that they may act as political champions for the Agenda for Humanity.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

86. The success of the World Humanitarian Summit and its ability to accelerate transformational change will only show over the coming months and years as we demonstrate our collective commitment to take the outcomes of the Summit forward and to steadfastly advance the Agenda for Humanity. We will need to adapt as challenges and opportunities arise, work in the new ways we identified, and do it together with the range of stakeholders and partners we embraced at the Summit.

87. On the basis of the foregoing, and in addition to the proposals I have made throughout the report, I recommend the following:

(a) Member States, United Nations, humanitarian organizations and all other relevant stakeholders should take forward, with urgency, the commitments and initiatives they made at the World Humanitarian Summit, champion and build support for them and self-report annually on concrete progress on implementation of commitments to the online Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation;

(b) Member States, the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and all other relevant stakeholders are encouraged to continue to make additional commitments and take initiatives to advance the Agenda for Humanity and the five core responsibilities set out in the report, "One humanity: shared responsibility", including through alignment with the core commitments, and to further support the initiatives launched at the Summit through applicable financial, political and operational support;

(c) Member States, the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and all other relevant stakeholders should champion their commitments and reach out to relevant stakeholders, as part of their implementation efforts, in order to leverage the capacities, resources and expertise available among the diverse set of actors who can contribute to the reduction of human need and suffering;

(d) Member States are encouraged to take forward the Agenda for Humanity and its five core responsibilities and other key outcomes of the Summit through deliberations in appropriate intergovernmental forums aimed at meeting and reducing humanitarian needs, risk and vulnerability;

(e) Member States, the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and all other relevant stakeholders should continue to strengthen the resource base and achieve efficiency gains to urgently address the shortfall in funding for addressing and reducing humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability, including through: ensuring predictable, flexible and multi-year financing; broadening the donor base; investing in prevention and preparedness; aligning humanitarian, climate and development finance; and making use of the wide range of financial tools available;

(f) Member States, the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and all other relevant stakeholders are encouraged to provide technical and financial support to local actors addressing humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability and to support people affected by crises, national and local actors, particularly those in developing countries, to implement their commitments and to take forward the Agenda for Humanity.

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Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, questions relating to refugees, returnees and displaced persons and humanitarian questions

Assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/134 on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa. It updates information contained in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly at its seventieth session (A/70/337) and covers the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. The report has been coordinated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and includes information provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the International Labour Organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Children's Fund. It also includes information drawn from publicly available reports by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

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I. Introduction

1. New and ongoing conflicts have generated further displacement in the Africa region[1] over the past year. Violence in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and South Sudan displaced hundreds of thousands of people internally and across borders, while the deteriorating situation in Yemen caused significant numbers to flee across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and seek safety in different countries in the region. Meanwhile, protracted conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia and the Sudan prevented millions from returning home.

2. As at the end of 2015, there were around 12 million internally displaced persons in Africa.[2] Their largest numbers were concentrated in the Sudan (3.2 million), Nigeria (2.1 million), South Sudan (1.7 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.5 million) and Somalia (1.2 million). Sub-Saharan Africa was home to the largest number of refugees in the world (an estimated 4.4 million). Refugees originating from the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan accounted for 80 per cent of that figure.

3. The majority of countries in Africa continued to uphold their long-standing tradition of hospitality towards and solidarity with refugees. Five African countries were among the world's top 10 refugee-hosting countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad. Despite this generosity, the economic, political and security challenges associated with hosting large numbers of refugees for an extended period cannot be underestimated.

4. The failure to address the root causes of conflict, together with insecurity and widespread human rights violations, were the main reasons behind the chronic nature of displacement in the region and the insufficient progress made with regard to the securing of solutions for displaced people. Meanwhile, food insecurity affected many refugees and internally displaced persons, with levels of acute malnutrition, stunting and anaemia on the rise. Aid agencies faced obstacles to gaining access to affected populations, which further exacerbated the humanitarian situation in some operations. In some of the most affected areas, food insecurity prompted negative coping strategies, including survival sex. Other challenges included the failure to ensure the civilian nature of asylum and of refugee camps, incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and insufficient funding for humanitarian operations.

II. Subregional overviews

A. East Africa, including the Horn of Africa

5. East Africa, including the Horn of Africa, had the largest displaced population on the continent, with some 3 million refugees and 6.2 million internally displaced persons as at the end of 2015. Several countries hosted refugees from two or more different conflicts. Uganda was home to more than 525,000 refugees from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as an increasing number from

[1] In the present report, "the Africa region" refers to sub-Saharan Africa only.

[2] According to statistics from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, available from www.internal-displacement.org.

South Sudan; 79 per cent were women and children. The largest host country in Africa was Ethiopia, which received nearly 75,000 new arrivals from East Africa and Yemen during 2015. This brought the total number of refugees in Ethiopia to 736,000. Altogether, some 87,000 people from Yemen arrived in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, although population movements from the Horn of Africa to Yemen also continued. Owing to its geographical location, Djibouti has increasingly become both a country of transit and of destination with regard to mixed movements to and from the region.

South Sudan situation

6. Intensified conflict between rival factions, a deepening economic crisis and growing food insecurity in South Sudan triggered new waves of displacement. As of June 2016, as the country prepared to mark its fifth year of independence, nearly 2.6 million people had been uprooted from their homes, 1.7 million of whom had been displaced internally and 870,000 across borders. Over 65 per cent of the displaced were children, of whom more than 34,000 were registered as unaccompanied or separated. Forced recruitment, looting by armed militias, sexual and gender-based violence and the abuse and killing of civilians continued. In some cases, those fleeing were reportedly prevented from crossing borders, while others were trapped in conflict areas and were unable to escape. Humanitarian access also remained a challenge.

7. The severe underfunding of humanitarian operations continued to hamper relief efforts. The "South Sudan regional refugee response plan", which covers the activities of various United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the four refugee-hosting countries, was 17 per cent funded as at the end of June 2016. Only life-saving assistance was available for the majority of refugees; funding shortfalls affected other essential activities, including education. As aid organizations struggled to receive new arrivals, basic services were overstretched and facilities overcrowded.

Somalia situation

8. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remained fragile, as insecurity prevailed in most districts in southern and central Somalia. Over 42,000 people in the southern region were newly displaced as a result of military operations that were launched in July 2015, and a further 90,000 people were temporarily displaced by armed conflict in Gaalkacyo. As at the end of 2015, over 1.2 million people in Somalia were internally displaced and the number of Somali refugees in the region stood at 1.1 million.

9. Despite the volatile situation, some progress was made in the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees. Over the past year and a half, some 14,000 refugees from the Dadaab camps in Kenya returned to Somalia. In May 2016, the Government of Kenya reiterated its intention to close the Dadaab refugee camps. It subsequently clarified, however, that any returns would be voluntary, in accordance with the tripartite agreement signed with the Government of Somalia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and that Kenya would continue to honour its obligations towards refugees under national and international law. Guided by consultations with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Yemen, the Global Initiative on Somali Refugees, launched in 2013,

continued to facilitate a dialogue on sustainable solutions for Somali refugees. In December 2015, the United Nations launched a solutions initiative for internally displaced persons in Somalia, with the aim of engaging the Government, humanitarian organizations and development partners in designing a countrywide solutions strategy for internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the onward movement of Somali refugees, notably from Ethiopia and the Sudan, remained a concern, including because of the large numbers of unaccompanied and separated children and the risks associated with trafficking and smuggling.

B. Central Africa and the Great Lakes

10. Crises in Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to produce large-scale displacement: on average, approximately 100 individuals arrived each day in the various countries of the subregion. As at the end of June 2016, there were over 1.6 million refugees and 1.9 million internally displaced persons in the Central Africa and the Great Lakes subregion, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounting for 92 per cent of the internally displaced persons.

Burundi situation

11. The political situation in Burundi remained at a stalemate following election-related violence that began in April 2015. Ongoing violence forced some 263,000 Burundians across borders into the United Republic of Tanzania (138,000), Rwanda (77,300), Uganda (24,000) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (23,000). Just over half of those refugees were children; 35 per cent were under 5 years of age. Although the number of refugees fleeing Burundi slowed from more than 2,500 per day at the peak of the crisis in May 2015 to around 280 per day early in 2016, those who managed to escape reported ongoing attacks, killings, torture and widespread fear. Contingency plans were in place to respond to any further displacement across borders during the year. In particular, agencies struggled to address instances of sexual and gender-based violence and to decongest overcrowded camps. Inside the country, an estimated 1.1 million people required humanitarian assistance and protection.

Central African Republic situation

12. During the reporting period, the Central African Republic witnessed renewed violence ahead of long-awaited presidential elections. However, the inauguration of a new President in March 2016 brought hope for peace, reconciliation and stability in the country. Refugees in three of the four host countries (Cameroon, Chad and the Congo) were able to take part in the elections.

13. Despite political progress, the humanitarian situation remained dire, with some 2.3 million people, or half of the population, in need of assistance. Health-care structures were destroyed during the conflict and less than 35 per cent of the population had access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities. Around one in five Central Africans were displaced by the conflict; some 391,500 individuals were displaced internally and there were 467,000 refugees seeking safety in Cameroon, Chad, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some 36,000 internally displaced persons from minority groups remained trapped in enclaves, and between 6,000 and 10,000 children were estimated to have been forcibly recruited by

armed groups. Access to the more than 7,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan in the east of the country was also a major challenge, since humanitarian workers were targeted by non-State armed groups.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

14. The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo deteriorated owing to increasing political instability and clashes among armed groups, both foreign and national, particularly in the eastern parts of the country. By the end of the reporting period, some 2.3 million people were displaced, either internally or externally, as a result of armed conflict and violence. Some 200,000 people were displaced in the eastern provinces in the first quarter of 2016, bringing the total number of internally displaced persons to 1.8 million. Rape continued to be used systematically as a weapon of war, disproportionately affecting internally displaced and refugee women. A recent assessment by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) in North Kivu found that only 23 per cent of internally displaced women and 8 per cent of returnee women were registered for ration cards, and although women produced 75 per cent of food in the country, men remained the main recipients of aid in this sector, with 96 per cent receiving agricultural kits. As a result of a lack of solutions for over half a million refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in neighbouring countries, UNHCR continued to implement its resettlement initiative for Congolese refugees and expects to be able to surpass its initial goal of referring at least 50,000 refugees for resettlement by 2017.

15. The Democratic Republic of the Congo also hosted over 380,000 refugees, mainly from Burundi, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. A sharp increase in incidents against humanitarian actors, including ambushes and abductions, restricted their access to those populations.

C. West Africa

16. As at the end of 2015, the subregion hosted some 295,000 refugees and had 2.7 million internally displaced persons. The signing of a peace and reconciliation agreement in mid-2015 notwithstanding, a sporadic resurgence of violence in Mali prevented voluntary return at anticipated levels. Violence in Nigeria escalated, with insurgents attacking civilian populations, including across borders.

Lake Chad Basin

17. In Nigeria, more than half of the 2 million internally displaced persons were children, and 90 per cent of such persons found refuge in host communities, placing a heavy strain on local resources. During the reporting period, the increased activity by non-State armed groups, sometimes operating across Nigeria's borders, caused an additional 155,000 Nigerians to flee the country and triggered internal displacement in Cameroon (157,000), the Niger (130,000) and Chad (66,000). The total number of internally displaced persons reached over 2.4 million. An estimated 96,000 refugees returned to Nigeria, sometimes involuntarily, from Cameroon and the Niger, owing in part to ongoing military operations. The registration of returnees was ongoing.

18. The Second Regional Security Summit, held in Abuja from 12 to 14 May 2016, underlined the need to take immediate action to address the humanitarian crisis and widespread hunger affecting internally displaced persons, refugees and host communities in the four countries concerned. The following month, the Government of Nigeria hosted a regional protection dialogue on the Lake Chad Basin to tackle the worrisome increase in protection incidents, including cases of refoulement. At the close of the dialogue, the Governments of Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria adopted the "Abuja action statement", in which they promised to take concrete steps to respond to the most pressing protection needs of affected populations.

Mali situation

19. Despite expectations that conditions in Mali would be conducive to voluntary return, more than 134,000 Malian refugees remained in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger at the end of the reporting period, and some 36,700 Malians were internally displaced. Among the 477,000 returnees in Mali, protection and humanitarian needs remained substantial. In addition, food insecurity continued to be prevalent throughout the country, affecting some 424,000 people.

D. Southern Africa

20. Southern Africa continued to host some 1.4 million displaced persons as at the end of December 2015, including 1.2 million asylum seekers, 190,000 refugees and 4,700 returnees. Ongoing large-scale mixed movements from other parts of the continent fuelled the growing concerns over national security and human trafficking and smuggling. However, identifying people in need of international protection proved difficult owing to constraints faced by the national asylum systems in the subregion. South Africa remained the primary country of destination for most asylum seekers despite a resurgence in xenophobia in 2015. The escalation of conflict in Mozambique resulted in the forced displacement of some 12,000 people fleeing to Malawi. Most have since returned home.

III. Protection

A. Protection landscape

21. While large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers were granted protection during the reporting period, core protection challenges were observed in various parts of the continent, with instances of refoulement and physical and administrative obstacles precluding refugees from gaining access to protection and assistance. Some Governments imposed strict security measures aimed at preventing terrorism but without the safeguards necessary to uphold the principle of non-refoulement. Human trafficking and smuggling, sexual and gender-based violence, forced recruitment and difficulties in maintaining the civilian character of asylum presented difficulties throughout the region. Against that backdrop, the United Nations worked with the Governments concerned to strengthen protection systems and responses.

22. Despite the ongoing generosity shown by many African States hosting large numbers of refugees for prolonged periods, several national asylum systems had not

fully established fair and efficient procedures. Furthermore, restrictions on movement and access to employment limited opportunities for refugees to become self-reliant and contribute meaningfully to their host communities. Owing to increasingly restrictive border control measures in regions of origin, transit and destination, many refugees and asylum seekers resorted to using criminal networks, with reports of human trafficking along the routes.

23. Registration remained an important means of protection, by providing a record of the status of individuals; protecting against refoulement, arbitrary arrest and detention; enabling refugees to access services and assistance; fostering freedom of movement; and keeping families together. Over the past year, efforts were focused on registering new arrivals, updating registration data and renewing documentation through verification exercises. UNHCR introduced a new biometric identity management system in Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

24. Family tracing and the reunification of unaccompanied and separated children continued to be a priority in displacement emergencies throughout the region. In East and Southern Africa, more than 37,000 unaccompanied and separated refugee children were assisted in family tracing and reunification and/or placement in interim foster care over the past year. In the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) launched a tracing application for mobile phones to support efforts to trace the family members of some 3,300 separated Burundian refugee children.

25. Many of the region's internally displaced persons faced similar challenges. Of the 54 members of the African Union, 40 are signatories to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) and as at the end of June 2016, 25 had acceded to it. Djibouti ratified the Convention during the reporting period. In December 2015, to mark the third anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention, the African Union Commission organized a capacity-building workshop in Addis Ababa and invited government representatives and legal and protection experts to support efforts to amend national legislation and policies to implement the key provisions of the Convention. In that regard, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia were developing national frameworks for internally displaced persons.

B. Asylum and migration

26. During the reporting period, regional dialogues and consultative processes on mixed movements in Africa sought to respond to growing protection concerns. The Valletta Summit on Migration, held in November 2015, was aimed at strengthening cooperation with regard to migration and forced displacement between Africa and Europe. The summit resulted in an action plan outlining a number of priority initiatives and the establishment of a €1.8 billion emergency trust fund. Within this new framework, the European Union, in partnership with relevant Governments, began to address forced displacement and onward movements in the Sahel region, the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa.

27. A number of economic and political factors accounted for the complex migration patterns in Africa. With the support of the International Organization for Migration, United Nations organizations and concerned Governments developed

strategies and plans of action in response to mixed movements. In June 2015, they finalized a strategy to address human trafficking, kidnappings and the smuggling of persons by strengthening alternatives to onward movements to enhance security and mitigate the risks of trafficking and smuggling, design protection responses for victims and build national capacities.

28. The International Labour Organization (ILO), with the support of the Government of Ethiopia, implemented a one-year technical cooperation project to prevent the exploitation of migrants, including victims of trafficking, through economic and social empowerment. ILO worked closely with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Ethiopia to support its efforts to address the needs of reintegrating returnees. In the southern part of the continent, the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa submitted its updated workplan on refugee protection and mixed movements to the member States of the Southern African Development Community, for implementation until 2018. These efforts were aimed at supporting member States in adopting and implementing concrete measures to manage mixed migration.

C. Addressing sexual and gender-based violence

29. An estimated one in five refugee or displaced women continued to experience sexual violence.[3] In urban areas, displaced women were at risk of human trafficking by organized crime networks, of harassment, exploitation and discrimination by property owners and employers, and of arbitrary arrest, detention and refoulement. In some cases, insufficient food rations, a lack of livelihood opportunities, barriers to national public services and the lack of documentation for refugees and asylum seekers caused displaced women to adopt negative coping strategies, including survival sex.

30. United Nations organizations responded to sexual and gender-based violence through community engagement, expanded access to essential services and legal aid facilities and the training of paralegals on the related crimes of groups ranging from the military to community leaders. In the Central African Republic, the United Nations Population Fund provided medical and psychosocial care to some 61,000 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, including 30,000 victims of rape and sexual slavery. During the reporting period, the Government of Zambia, in partnership with United Nations organizations, launched two fast-track courts, the first of their kind, to ensure that cases of sexual and gender-based violence were prosecuted in an expedited manner.

31. In West Africa, United Nations organizations and partners provided support services and protection to refugee women and girls with regard to sexual and gender-based violence. In Adamawa State in Nigeria and eastern regions of Cameroon, some 29,000 people in refugee and host communities, including 16,900 women, 9,200 men and 2,700 children, took part in sensitization activities on women's rights, the risks of early and forced marriages, and sexual and gender-based violence. An emergency programme in Uganda was targeted at host communities and 30,000 women refugees to help to prevent and respond to violence. In Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda,

[3] Alexander Vu and others, "The prevalence of sexual violence among female refugees in complex humanitarian emergencies: a systematic review and meta-analysis", *Public Library of Science Currents: Disasters*, vol. 6 (March 2014). Available from www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4012695/.

evidence-based prevention programmes also raised awareness and engaged men and boys in transformative behavioural change.

D. Child protection

32. Conflict and violence across the region continued to pose increasing risks for children, including physical and psychological harm, forced recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence. Between November 2015 and February 2016, some 6,900 grave violations against South Sudanese children were reported. With a view to contributing to a safer environment for displaced children, United Nations organizations strengthened child protection systems through monitoring and referral mechanisms and established child-friendly spaces. Identifying children at heightened risk, including unaccompanied and separated children, remained a significant challenge. In that regard, resources for targeted responses to child protection needs were inadequate. Legal assistance and psychosocial support services remained overstretched.

33. In the Gambella region of Ethiopia, 11 child-friendly spaces were established for over 76,000 children, and 19 help desks were created, serving over 15,000 children. In the Lake Chad Basin, girls faced heightened protection risks, including forced marriages and sexual abuse, while boys risked being abducted and forcibly recruited. Southern Africa saw the strengthening of community-based protection systems through the establishment of additional child protection committees. A national steering committee was created in South Africa to facilitate access to national services and expedite the process of providing care to unaccompanied children.

IV. Statelessness

34. The right to a nationality is increasingly being recognized as an important human right. Most sub-Saharan African States are parties to relevant international instruments, including 22 that are parties to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and 14 that are parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. As of late June 2016, Mali and Sierra Leone had acceded to both conventions and Madagascar, Liberia and Somalia were in the process of reforming their nationality laws. The adoption of a draft protocol on the right to nationality in Africa by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in August 2015 paved the way towards ending statelessness on the continent.

35. Positive steps have been reported in regional efforts to combat statelessness. The Southern African Development Community began to address statelessness at the subregional level through one of its four priority sectors in the "Southern Africa strategic plan of action to address mixed and irregular migration 2015-2018", which was adopted in July 2015. One of its goals includes promotion of the accession to and implementation of both of the statelessness conventions by the end of 2018.

36. In Côte d'Ivoire, the authorities had received, through a special naturalization procedure, more than 120,000 applications for Ivorian nationality from long-term residents as at the end of 2015. As a result, more than 2,000 stateless persons acquired Ivorian nationality. Although the procedure closed in January 2016, applications continued to be processed; thousands of others expect to obtain Ivorian

nationality by the end of 2016. In East Africa, including the Horn of Africa, significant progress was made in birth and civil registration in Uganda, where the births of some 4,700 refugee children were registered, and in Kenya, where efforts were made to ensure the birth registration of children in communities at risk of statelessness.

V. Humanitarian response and constraints

A. Delivery of humanitarian assistance

Food and nutrition

37. During the reporting period, the World Food Programme (WFP) provided food to 8.2 million refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees in 25 countries across sub-Saharan Africa, including through cash transfers, seasonal support, nutrition assistance, school meals and "food assistance for assets" programmes. Since most refugees were either partially or entirely dependent on aid, nutritional needs were met through direct food assistance, cash or vouchers, which increased diet diversity. In particular, WFP and other United Nations organizations worked to ensure that refugee children, women and vulnerable groups had access to age-appropriate, nutritious food as part of malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes. WFP provided fortified food to pregnant and nursing women and children under 5 years of age. Livelihood and self-reliance initiatives also accompanied food assistance in some protracted refugee situations.

38. Owing to funding shortfalls, food ration reductions threatened the nutrition and food security of many displaced persons. Between September 2015 and February 2016, cuts in food distribution affected 1.97 million, or 56 per cent, of refugees across 15 countries. Refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia saw their rations reduced by between 20 and 30 per cent, as did some refugee groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

39. Reduced food assistance had far-reaching consequences for refugee children. In 2015, some 143,000 refugee children under 5 years of age were treated for acute malnutrition. Of 93 sites surveyed, UNHCR reported that levels of stunting, which is an indicator of chronic malnutrition, were high in 65 sites (70 per cent). Of 90 sites surveyed, levels of anaemia among refugee children under 5 years of age fell within acceptable standards in only six sites (7 per cent). In response to high malnutrition rates among children under 5 years of age in refugee and internally displaced settings, UNICEF implemented therapeutic treatment programmes for some 1,200 refugee children in camps in Rwanda and promoted infant and young child nutrition and supplementary feeding programmes. In South Sudan, an emergency programme, which included the UNICEF and WFP nutrition response, entered its second year in July 2015, reaching 53 per cent more children in 2015 than in 2014.

Health

40. During the reporting period, a number of factors, including overcrowding in camps, inadequate water supply, poor sanitary conditions and poor vaccination coverage, increased the risk of outbreaks of infectious diseases. Sudden shifts in the

composition of communities as a result of new arrivals also led to outbreaks, including of measles, cholera, malaria and meningitis.

41. Through mobile clinics, strengthened local health-care systems and enhanced surveillance, preparedness and response to diseases, United Nations organizations and partners brought much-needed health care to more than 1.5 million refugees inside and outside camps across the region. Promoting access to national health-care structures was one of the key components of achieving sustainability. The World Health Organization and health partners supported States in their efforts to include refugees in such structures.

42. The United Nations and its partners also advocated for the inclusion of refugees and other displaced persons in national vaccination campaigns. In Ghana, as at the end of 2015, 87 per cent of refugees from Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo had gained access to the national health insurance scheme. In Ethiopia, vaccines against measles and polio were delivered, and over 19,600 refugee children were vaccinated against measles and 21,000 were vaccinated against polio.

43. Through a multisectoral response, including with regard to public health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene, the quality of water and sanitation facilities in refugee camps improved across the region, particularly in Chad, Malawi, Rwanda and South Sudan. Progress was made with regard to community mobilization on hygiene and health risk education, as well as case management and surveillance. Mortality rates stabilized: most of the refugee sites surveyed fell within acceptable standards. In the Lake Chad Basin, the United Nations Population Fund supported 30,000 safe deliveries, distributed over 50,000 dignity kits, delivered reproductive health supplies to 326 health facilities and provided more than 40,000 women with family planning information and services. Overall, there was a marked improvement for refugees accessing reproductive health services in 2015.

44. New unmet public health priorities have emerged in recent years. Cervical cancer prevention is a priority for which new solutions and innovative models that increase access to affordable and quality health-care services for girls and women were piloted in several countries by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, with the support of United Nations organizations. In Liberia, Rwanda and Uganda, refugee girls who were 11 years of age were successfully included in national human papillomavirus vaccination programmes.

45. Emergencies and conflicts have disrupted services and limited access to life-saving assistance for many people living with HIV. In 2015, United Nations organizations and partners promoted and implemented community-based programmes to prevent treatment disruption for people living with HIV in communities affected by the Ebola crisis. During the reporting period, more references to refugees or internally displaced persons living with HIV were found in national strategic plans. With a view to ending the HIV/AIDS epidemic by 2030, such integration was essential, including to prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child.

Education

46. Meeting the education needs of displaced children and youth across the region, particularly in conflict-affected situations, remained a considerable challenge. Low enrolment in schools, congested classrooms, inadequate water and sanitary facilities and poor teaching qualifications affected the overall quality of education, which often fell below international standards. For many displaced children and youth, other challenges included difficulties with the language of instruction and the lack of access to secondary education. Working groups and tools were created to improve the quality of teaching and data collection and to diversify the donor base to mobilize the necessary resources. United Nations organizations, in collaboration with national authorities and other partners, also supported the inclusion of refugee children in national education systems to ensure sustainable access to education while improving services for both refugees and host communities.

47. Refugee children had access to national education systems in 30 of 37 countries in sub-Saharan Africa surveyed by UNHCR. Not all refugee children had access to education in the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Liberia and the Sudan, while the authorities in Burundi, Djibouti and the United Republic of Tanzania were making efforts to address the situation in their countries.

48. United Nations organizations continued to support education needs in both protracted displacement and emergency situations through the expansion of safe learning spaces, capacity-building for teachers and strengthened partnerships with key education actors. They also provided cash grants and vouchers, promoted accelerated education and distributed school supplies. Education was included as a priority in the emergency responses to the refugee situations in Burundi, the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

49. In the Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya, access to primary education improved; the enrolment rate rose from 65 per cent to 73 per cent in 2015, despite the continued arrival of South Sudanese refugees and the relatively low participation of girls. In Chad, enrolment rates also increased from 68 per cent to 77 per cent, and in Cameroon, enrolment rates for Nigerian refugees in the Far North Region rose from 61 per cent to 90 per cent. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations and its partners provided support to the Ministry of Education to ensure inclusion of Burundian refugee children in primary schools located in close proximity to the Lusenda refugee camp. In Somalia, access to education for refugee children and youth was guaranteed by the Somaliland Ministry of Education in 2015. Refugees were able to enrol at any public school and obtain the same education and qualifications as local students.

50. In South Sudan, an estimated 970,000 children, many of whom were internally displaced, were prevented from going to school in 2015. During the year, some 100 schools were occupied, destroyed or closed. UNICEF scaled up its "Back to Learning" programme, which reached 240 per cent more children than in 2014. WFP supported attendance with school meals for students and high-energy biscuits or snacks at schools affected by a crisis or emergency. Meal assistance often included take-home rations to families with children, particularly girls, who attended school regularly. Inadequate funding hampered the provision of basic education services to refugees and internally displaced persons. On average, the funding gap in the education response over the past year was 77 per cent (ranging

from 31 per cent in South Sudan to 90 per cent for the Burundian refugees in Uganda), amounting to a shortfall of approximately $21 million.

Livelihoods

51. In sub-Saharan Africa, there were few livelihood opportunities owing to low investment and limited job opportunities, competition over natural resources, scarce financial resources, poor financing and capacity, and climate change. People who were forced to flee their homes and leave their assets behind faced an even greater share of the challenges in that regard.

52. Across the region, agriculture was the most important sector of the economy, accounting for over half of employment and one fifth of the gross domestic product. During the reporting period, refugees in Chad received high-yield maize and sorghum seeds from the Ministry of Agriculture to increase production, as well as technical assistance. In Ethiopia, Somali refugees and host communities were supported through irrigation schemes. Other agricultural programmes that included displaced persons were under development in the Gambia, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia.

53. In the Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme supported 5,200 households, 40 per cent of which included internally displaced persons and refugees in crisis-affected communities, in developing skills and assets, and promoted self-reliance. Some 52 per cent of beneficiaries reported increases in their annual incomes. In South Sudan, 2,200 women and girls from displaced and host communities acquired vocational skills through training programmes provided by UN-Women and engaged in income-generating activities and "cash for work" programmes.

54. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations agencies and partners carried out pilot projects in four communities to provide conflict-affected populations with sustainable livelihood opportunities. As a result, more than 105,000 people had improved access to basic social services and over 84 per cent of the participants had invested their savings into economic activities, including business development.

55. United Nations organizations, including ILO and UNHCR, collaborated on market-based approaches to livelihoods that benefited refugees and host communities. Market assessments were conducted and livelihood strategies developed to improve opportunities for refugees to participate in the marketplace in 11 countries. New initiatives were launched in Kenya and Uganda to develop job opportunities through teleworking.

B. Security and humanitarian access

56. Attacks and threats against humanitarian workers limited the effective delivery of humanitarian aid and, in some cases, restricted access to displaced populations in many operations in sub-Saharan Africa. In East Africa, including the Horn of Africa, 29 humanitarian workers were killed and 38 were wounded in security incidents and a further 13 aid workers were kidnapped. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 20 aid workers in North Kivu were abducted and later released. In the Central African Republic, NGOs reported that the number of attacks against aid workers was among the highest in the world.

57. In southern and central Somalia, humanitarian access remained limited owing to roadblocks and checkpoints established by non-State armed groups. Security escorts were required owing to security incidents and threats made against aid workers. In the Sudan, access was also restricted in much of the Jebel Marra in Darfur and in areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. Insecurity and violence and government restrictions on transport movements and clearances continued to hamper humanitarian access.

58. United Nations organizations faced significant challenges in providing assistance to over 2 million internally displaced persons in Nigeria and more than 150,000 refugees and internally displaced persons in the Niger owing to insecurity. In the Lake Chad Basin, humanitarian escorts were required on key roads, and of particular concern to the security of aid workers and beneficiaries alike were landmines, unexploded ordnance and the threat of improvised explosive devices. Following the signature of the peace agreement in Mali, access had improved, but NGOs reported that security incidents were three times more frequent than in 2014.

VI. Solutions

Voluntary repatriation

59. Although the creation of conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation proved challenging, efforts to facilitate voluntary return in safety and dignity continued. In 2015, some 4,600 people repatriated to Angola, primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An estimated 4,700 Rwandans also returned home voluntarily, bringing the total number of returns to over 160,000 since 2000. With a view to supporting those efforts, UNHCR facilitated a regional ministerial-level meeting in October 2015 on its comprehensive strategy for the Rwandan refugee situation, during which government representatives agreed to renew efforts to ensure full implementation of the strategy by the end of 2017.

60. In October 2015, at a pledging conference hosted by the European Commission and UNHCR in Brussels, representatives from over 40 countries and organizations pledged $105 million to support Somali refugees in Kenya, help them to return voluntarily to Somalia and facilitate their reintegration. At the conference, a plan of action designed to improve socioeconomic conditions in Somalia and support refugees preparing for return from the Dadaab camps in Kenya was adopted. As of June 2016, some $68 million that had been pledged during the conference had yet to be allocated.

61. In West Africa, the repatriation of Ivorian refugees from Liberia resumed at the end of 2015; around 18,000 refugees were assisted in returning home by the middle of 2016. During the reporting period, the voluntary return of Malian refugees continued to be facilitated, including through cash assistance for returnees.

Resettlement and alternative pathways to admission

62. Resettlement and humanitarian entry programmes remained a crucial protection tool, in particular when addressing the needs of vulnerable refugees. In West Africa, emphasis was placed on finding durable solutions for some 70,000 refugees living in situations of protracted displacement, including Mauritanian refugees in Mali and Senegal, Togolese refugees in Ghana, Ghanaian refugees in

Togo, Senegalese refugees in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and Ivorian refugees across the subregion.

63. In 2015, resettlement submissions from Africa reached 38,900, the highest number ever recorded. The largest number of submissions involved refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. During the reporting period, there were departures to resettlement countries from 39 countries of asylum, including Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. A group resettlement initiative was also initiated in the United Republic of Tanzania with a view to resettling some 32,000 Congolese refugees in the next four years, mainly to the United States of America.

64. States in the region are increasingly collaborating to explore the use of complementary pathways to protection and solutions, including in West Africa. Agreements by the Economic Community of West African States that allow nationals of member States of the Economic Community to move and work freely within the subregion may provide solutions for refugees and even facilitate pathways to permanent residency and naturalization.

Local integration and increased access to rights

65. While opportunities for local integration remained limited, it proved to be a solution for some refugees living in protracted displacement. In West Africa, Liberians in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Sierra Leone received a final set of passports and residence permits. Advocacy efforts helped to accelerate the naturalization of Rwandans in Benin, Guinea, Mali, the Niger, Senegal and Togo. The granting of citizenship to more than 151,000 former Burundian refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania and 36,000 of their descendants continued to represent a notable advance in local integration. In Southern Africa, the Government of Zambia approved expanded criteria for the local integration of Angolans, thereby offering all former Angolan refugees who had arrived in Zambia before 2003, as well as some 4,000 Rwandans, an opportunity to integrate locally.

66. The gradual inclusion of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced and stateless persons in their host countries contributed to the progressive attainment of a range of solutions, including voluntary return. While some countries maintained their reservations about key provisions of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, such as the right to work and freedom of movement, others made important progress towards ensuring the greater inclusion and enjoyment of rights of displaced persons. For example, local authorities in the Gambia assisted refugees in acquiring land for residential and farming purposes, and the Government granted a waiver of an income tax previously levied on refugees.

VII. Coordination and partnerships

67. In 2015 and early in 2016, the joint note by UNHCR and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on mixed situations[4] continued to be implemented, where applicable, in refugee operations and complex humanitarian emergencies. Support for implementation included the provision of technical guidance and capacity-building. Inter-agency missions to Cameroon and the Sudan

[4] Available from www.unhcr.org/53679e679.pdf.

also provided support to Humanitarian Coordinators and humanitarian country teams to enhance the coordination and delivery of assistance for all affected populations, including refugees and internally displaced persons. To ensure a more holistic overview of sectoral requirements, the needs and response requirements for refugees were incorporated into the humanitarian needs overviews and humanitarian response plans of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

68. The transformative agenda of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee continued to provide a framework for focused support and enhanced inter-agency coordination. A system-wide level 3 emergency response remained in place for South Sudan until May 2016, enabling a sustained expansion of the response to the crisis. Since key operational benchmarks had been met by May 2016, the level 3 response was deactivated, although it was stressed that sustained capacity, engagement and resources would remain critical in South Sudan as the humanitarian crisis continued to worsen.

69. The Emergency Directors Group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee continued to support the implementation of the transformative agenda. The Chair of the Group travelled to Nigeria late in 2015 to take stock of the impact of the deteriorating crisis in the north-east of the country and at the regional level. The Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team also undertook support missions to Chad and the Central African Republic late in 2015 and early in 2016. Strengthening the collective leadership of humanitarian country teams, accountability to affected people and the centrality of protection in humanitarian action remained crucial objectives for the United Nations and its humanitarian partners.

World Humanitarian Summit

70. The first ever World Humanitarian Summit was held in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2016. At the close of the Summit, some 1,500 commitments were made, including on upholding international protection standards, strengthening national legislation and policies to protect internally displaced persons, and supporting the implementation of the Kampala Convention. Participants resolved to explore new approaches to reducing internal displacement and better addressing the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons, in particular by creating livelihood and education opportunities and providing more predictable and multi-year funding.

ProCap

71. During the reporting period, the inter-agency Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) facilitated the deployment of 10 Senior Protection Officers to support the United Nations in the Central African Republic, northern Nigeria and South Sudan. The Senior Protection Officers also developed and carried out protection strategies in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan. In addition, deployments were focused on assisting Governments in implementing national policies for internally displaced persons and durable solutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. At the regional level, ProCap officers were deployed to 25 countries, including to respond to the Burundi situation.

72. As of February 2016, UNHCR assumed the role of Chair of the Solutions Alliance, which brought together host and donor Governments, United Nations organizations, civil society organizations, the private sector, international financial

institutions and academic institutions to seek approaches to resolve situations of displacement and prevent new ones from becoming protracted. In 2016, new national groups for the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda were established, adding to the national groups for Somalia and Zambia.

73. Over the past year, UNHCR and the World Bank deepened collaboration at the global policy and field levels. Three joint studies (in the Sahel, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa) provided regional situation analyses of forced displacement and informed programming priorities. In May 2016, they also began collaboration on a $175 million project entitled "Development response to displacement impacts project in the Horn of Africa" to improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities and enhance environmental management for refugee-hosting communities in parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda.

VIII. Funding

74. In 2015, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator allocated $246 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund to support life-saving activities in 24 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This included allocations from the Fund's rapid response window ($172 million) and its window for underfunded emergencies ($74 million), and represented 52 per cent of the $470 million allocated by the Fund worldwide. Some $148 million enabled aid agencies to provide humanitarian assistance in response to displacement crises in Africa. A total of 172 Central Emergency Response Fund projects in Africa provided assistance and protection to refugees, internally displaced persons and other affected populations, including host communities.

75. In 2015, the Central Emergency Response Fund also provided funding in response to several regional displacement crises in Africa. During 2015 and January 2016, $58 million of funding went towards assisting people who had been displaced as a result of conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. In September 2015, the Fund provided $21 million to help people displaced by violence in Darfur, including internally displaced persons in the Sudan and refugees in Chad, as well as host communities.

76. Aid agencies in the Sudan received the highest amount of funding to respond to the displacement crisis ($22 million), followed by those in Chad ($17 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($15 million), Cameroon ($14 million) and the Niger ($14 million). Nearly $11 million was also provided in response to conflict and displacement in South Sudan, $12 million in response to the displacement crisis in the Central African Republic, and more than $5 million for Yemeni refugees in Somalia. The largest sectors receiving financial support were food ($37 million), refugee assistance ($20 million) and health ($16 million).

Country-based pooled funding mechanisms

77. As of May 2016, country-based pooled funds allocated $426 million for humanitarian activities in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan, 70 per cent of which went to projects addressing needs caused by displacement. In South Sudan, 99 per cent of the pooled fund ($129 million) went to people affected by displacement, while 67 per cent of country-based pooled funding for the Democratic Republic of

the Congo ($53.4 million) was allocated to respond to displacement. A similar trend was observed in the Central African Republic, Somalia and the Sudan, where between 43 and 80 per cent of the funds allocated went towards meeting the needs of the displaced.

IX. Conclusions and recommendations

78. Levels of forced displacement in sub-Saharan Africa continued to grow for a sixth consecutive year, forcing hundreds of thousands from their homes and preventing millions of others from returning. This trend is deeply concerning, in particular because it involves a rising number of children and, as noted above, because of the high number of refugee and displaced women experiencing sexual violence. A renewed commitment to address the root causes of conflict, including discrimination, exclusion, growing competition over diminishing resources and impunity, is urgently needed to reverse this trend. Strong collaboration between Governments, affected populations and communities, civil society, United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations remains as crucial as ever to respond to the growing humanitarian needs on the continent.

79. New approaches that recognize that displacement has both humanitarian and development dimensions emerged in some countries, which enabled refugees to become self-sufficient, including through freedom of movement and employment. Multi-donor and multi-year programmes to assist the forcibly displaced and host communities increased, but needs continued to outpace resources. Legal frameworks underpinning the rights of refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons were enacted at the national and regional levels to strengthen international protection and assistance instruments. These positive developments notwithstanding, more is needed to prevent conflict and to ensure that national laws and systems provide effective protection to the growing number of forcibly displaced people, in line with international obligations. Against that backdrop:

(a) I urge all States to spare no effort to resolutely address the root causes of all forms of displacement and to intensify their efforts to foster peace, stability and prosperity in Africa with a view to preventing conflict and alleviating human suffering;

(b) I remind all States of their obligation to respect the right to asylum, including the principle of non-refoulement, to keep their borders open to those who flee persecution and conflict, and to find ways of providing appropriate and adequate protection along migratory routes to protect those on the move, especially children and women, from exploitation, trafficking, violence and death;

(c) I encourage the United Nations and its Member States to remind parties to conflicts to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of camps and settlements for refugees and internally displaced persons, and to condemn any attacks on them. All State and non-State actors must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access to people in need, including refugees and internally displaced persons. Humanitarian personnel, supplies and facilities must also be safeguarded and protected;

(d) All African States that have not yet acceded to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are urged to do so. I also encourage further action in identifying and addressing incidents of statelessness in Africa in line with the UNHCR global campaign to end statelessness by 2024;

(e) I call upon Member States to ensure that the specific needs of internally displaced persons and refugees are addressed while implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, in line with the commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit;

(f) I also call upon Member States and international partners to address the particular needs of youth between 15 and 24 years of age, including through innovative and accessible livelihood and education opportunities, to provide hope and enable them to build a future;

(g) I call upon human rights bodies and humanitarian agencies to better monitor, prevent and respond to serious human rights violations, in particular those committed against women and children, for example through the strengthening of protection mechanisms established by the Security Council in its resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1960 (2010);

(h) I call upon States to include refugees and internally displaced persons, particularly women, in national and intercommunal dialogue and to engage them, along with local and national governments, civil society and United Nations organizations, in matters that affect their daily lives, including policing, justice, access to government services and psychosocial support, as well as sexual and gender-based violence and HIV prevention and response activities;

(i) United Nations organizations, States and the private sector are called upon to contribute to new innovations in technology for energy and the environment and to make them available to the forcibly displaced and host communities in Africa as a way to mitigate the impact of protracted displacement situations;

(j) I encourage and support new partnerships with non-traditional actors and donors to broaden the funding base for humanitarian action in Africa, and I call upon the international community to provide flexible and unearmarked funding in a predictable manner to enable humanitarian organizations and affected States and communities to respond to the unprecedented needs.

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Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan

Report of the Secretary-General**

Summary

The present report has been prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/89 and provides an update on Israel's activities aimed at creating and expanding settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. It includes a case study on the impact of the settlements on the human rights situation in Hebron.

* A/71/150.
** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/89 and provides an update on its implementation for the period from 16 May 2015 to 31 May 2016. It should be read in conjunction with previous reports of the Secretary-General on Israeli settlements to the Assembly and to the Human Rights Council.[1]

2. The report shows how settlement expansion activities continued unabated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that instances of settler violence remained a concern, notwithstanding a decline in incidence. It also features a case study on the impact of the settlements on the human rights situation in the West Bank city of Hebron.

II. Legal background

3. In its resolution 70/89, the General Assembly reaffirmed the illegality of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, as ruled by the International Court of Justice, and reiterated by the Security Council and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. These settlements amount to the transfer of a State's population to the territory it occupies, which is prohibited by international humanitarian law.[2] To meet its international legal obligations, Israel must stop building settlements, reverse any settlement development activity and make full reparations, which include the obligation to re-establish the situation affected by the violation.[3] The transfer of the occupying Power's population to the territory it occupies amounts to a war crime that may lead to the individual criminal responsibility of the officials involved.[4]

III. Update on settlement-related activities

A. Settlement expansion

4. Previous reports of the Secretary-General have clarified the role of Israel in the construction and expansion of settlements.[5] Besides the allocation of land for the purposes of constructing settlement homes and infrastructure, Israel also supports settlements through the delivery of public services, the encouragement of economic activities, including agriculture and industries around the settlements, the development of national parks and tourist sites, support for private initiatives and the retroactive approval of unauthorized constructions. Population growth in Israeli

[1] See A/HRC/28/44 and, in particular, A/HRC/31/43, which cover the first months of the period under review. See also A/69/348 and A/70/351.

[2] Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention), art. 49 (6). See also A/69/348, paras. 4 and 5, and A/HRC/25/38, paras. 4 and 5.

[3] International Law Commission, draft articles for the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 2001, arts. 30 and 31.

[4] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (b) (viii).

[5] A/68/513, paras. 23-29, A/69/348, paras. 33-35, and A/70/351, paras. 33-36.

settlements is also encouraged by providing benefits and incentives in the areas of housing, education and taxes.

B. Constructions, tenders and plans

5. Steps by Israel to expand settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, continued. In March 2016, Israeli media reported that Israel had declared 234 hectares of land south of Jericho, the largest appropriation of land since August 2014, as "State land".[6] Overall trends point to a slowdown in the issuance of planning approvals and tenders in 2015, with 1,143 housing units tendered, returning to pre-2012 figures.[7] However, this has been offset by support for private initiatives and steps to gain the retroactive approval of unauthorized construction during the same period.

6. By contrast, construction rates remained high, in particular for Area C, with 1,806 construction starts recorded by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics for 2015, compared with 1,556 construction starts in 2014. This likely reflects the significant number of units that had already been cleared for construction in previous years. East Jerusalem saw a drop in construction starts in 2015 (429 starts), after a year of intensive building in 2014.

C. Privately led initiatives supported by Israel

7. An unprecedented wave of seizures of Palestinian properties by private settler associations in the Old City of Jerusalem and adjacent neighbourhoods has been reported by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Ir Amim since mid-2015.[8] This trend includes the forced evictions of Palestinian families from their homes. These seizures and evictions are attributable mainly to the settler-affiliated organization Ateret Cohanim (A/70/351, paras. 29-32), which has been purchasing East Jerusalem houses or filing successful pre-1948 ownership claims,[9] with the apparent support of the Israeli Ministry of Justice.[10] Various State authorities have also aided in or coordinated the transfer of property and the eviction of Palestinians.

8. Of particular concern are ongoing developments within the Batan al-Hawa neighbourhood of Silwan, which is likely to feature the largest settlement near the Old City and adjacent neighbourhoods. On 26 August and 1 September 2015, Israeli settlers escorted by police moved into two residential buildings. On 19 October 2015, two Palestinian families were forcibly evicted, as police officers were deployed and the entire area placed under curfew. While 17 Palestinian families had

[6] "Israel seizes large tracts of land in West Bank, report says", *Haaretz*, 15 March 2016.

[7] From July 2014 to May 2016, 330 units were validated for construction in Area C settlements, compared with 1,035 during the first half of 2014 alone.

[8] Ir Amim, "Planning, building, and settlements in East Jerusalem: 2015 year-end review", January 2016.

[9] Under Israeli law, Israeli citizens may submit claims regarding land or property allegedly owned by Jews in East Jerusalem prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. The reciprocal right is not granted to Palestinians, who are not entitled to reclaim land and property in Israel.

[10] Ir Amim, "Planning, building and settlements in East Jerusalem: 2015 year-end review", and Nir Hasson, "How Israel helps settler group move Jews into East Jerusalem's Silwan", *Haaretz*, 6 January 2016.

already been evicted during 2015, eviction demands were pending against 15 additional families and 70 additional families were currently facing the same risk at the time of writing the present report.[8] According to Ir Amim, "these collective and fast unfolding developments signify a steep increase over the last year and a clear pattern of using demolitions and evictions to displace Palestinians from the city".[11] In addition, a building permit request for a large three-story building that would add to an existing settlement is awaiting approval.[12] The development of settlements and the potential arrival of hundreds of settlers in the densely populated area of Batan al-Hawa further exacerbate friction between Palestinian residents, settlers and the Israeli security forces.

9. Palestinian residents of the Old City are also facing evictions. Settlers seized a living space in the Muslim Quarter and evicted its Palestinian resident. Two Palestinian families received eviction orders and claims were submitted against four additional families.[8]

D. "Legalization" of outposts and other unauthorized construction

10. Unauthorized settlement construction in the West Bank remains widespread. More than 100 unauthorized outposts and thousands of housing units in existing settlements have been erected over the years without the formal approval of the Israeli authorities. A recent report of the Israeli State Comptroller[13] concluded that there were substantial flaws in law enforcement mechanisms under the Israeli Civil Administration with regard to the ongoing phenomenon of unauthorized Israeli construction in the West Bank. Those flaws would result in the inadequate monitoring of illegal construction and a lack of enforcement of demolition orders, even in areas designated as high priority.[13]

11. Israel continued to promote settlements in the West Bank through the retroactive approval of illegal constructions.[14] Since May 2011, Israeli authorities have either completed or initiated steps for the retroactive "legalization", under Israeli law,[15] of at least one quarter of the outposts in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and there are indications that those processes are still being advanced.[16] In addition, steps were taken to retroactively approve housing units built without the

[11] Ir Amim, "Mounting uptick in eviction and demolition orders in Old City and historic basin cause for heightened attention".

[12] The Jerusalem Local Planning Committee approved the construction on 15 June 2016. See https://settlementwatcheastjerusalem.wordpress.com/2016/05/31/batan-al-hawa-new-building/.

[13] State Comptroller, "Judea and Samaria area: activities of the Unit for Inspection and Enforcement and Land Regulation Aspects", (annual report No. 66B), 2016.

[14] Ziv Stahl, "From occupation to annexation: the silent adoption of the Levy report on retroactive authorization of illegal construction in the West Bank", position paper (Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights, 2016).

[15] Construction of unauthorized outposts deemed to be illegal under Israeli law. All settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are illegal under international law.

[16] Nineteen outposts have undergone "legalization" and in at least 13 more the Government of Israel has indicated its intentions or initiated the process of "legalization". See Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights, "Under the radar: Israel's silent policy of transforming unauthorized outposts into official settlements", 17 May 2015. During the period under review, the Government conveyed its intentions to the High Court of Justice to retroactively approve outposts in the southern Nablus and eastern Ramallah districts.

prior authorization of the relevant planning authorities.[17] Retroactive legalization typically involves the expansion of the jurisdiction of existing settlements to encompass outposts as nearby "neighbourhoods". While these measures allow Israel to circumvent the formal establishment of new settlements, possibly avoiding international scrutiny, the net effect of these efforts is the entrenchment of otherwise isolated settlement points and their connection with so-called settlement blocs. Joining the dots gradually paves the way for new contiguous areas of settlement control over land. These steps also have the effect of sanctioning illegal activity by settler groups in an environment that has been characterized by a culture of impunity.

12. As previously reported by the Secretary-General, this process marks a significant departure from previous Israeli policy[18] and is reinforced by efforts to adopt the recommendations of the government-appointed committee to examine the status of construction, known as the "Levy committee", which proposed concrete measures for the so-called "regulation", amounting to the retroactive approval of unauthorized settlement construction in the West Bank.[14]

13. Given that 80 per cent of unauthorized outposts were constructed partially or entirely on privately owned Palestinian land,[19] several administrative measures taken in the context of facilitating outpost legalization are aimed at resolving the issue of proprietary status. This includes the appointment, in July 2015, by the Prime Minister of Israel of a professional committee tasked with formulating recommendations to advance retroactive authorizations on privately owned Palestinian land[20] and the work of the Israeli Civil Administration's task force for the survey of State land boundaries, also known as the Blue Line task force, assigned with inspecting and defining the boundaries of land designated as State property, or so-called "State land", by Israeli authorities since 1970 (A/HRC/22/63, para. 63). The task force significantly accelerated its work during the period under review. In 2015 alone, it ratified more than 6,300 hectares of Area C land as "State land", almost as much as during the three previous years.[21]

14. Legislative measures aimed at easing the process of the retroactive authorization of outposts were also introduced. These include the land regulation bill of October 2015, which is currently stalled (A/HRC/31/43, para. 28), and a

[17] Peace Now, "No settlement freeze, especially not in isolated settlements: 2015 in the settlements", February 2016.

[18] Israel's position, as presented on numerous occasions before the High Court of Justice until 2011, affirmed the unauthorized status of outposts and its intention to evacuate and demolish them.

[19] Peace Now, "West Bank settlements: facts and figures, June 2009".

[20] The Committee's conclusions were slated for publication in December 2015; at the time of writing, they had not yet been released.

[21] Ziv Stahl, "From occupation to annexation: the silent adoption of the Levy report on retroactive authorization of illegal construction in the West Bank". The policies and practices of the Blue Line task force have come under increasing scrutiny, including by the Israeli State Comptroller and the High Court of Justice, in particular with regard to a lack of transparency and concerns regarding absent mechanisms to ensure the protection of property rights of Palestinian landowners. The impact of resulting Israeli Civil Administration amendments to the operating procedures of the task force, which were ordered by the Court during the period under review, is yet to be assessed. See A/HRC/31/43, paras. 21-23, and State Comptroller, annual report No. 66B.

newly drafted bill,[22] which seeks to delay the court-ordered demolition of settlement structures built on privately owned Palestinian land.[23]

E. National parks and archaeological sites

15. As previously reported (A/HRC/31/43, para. 16), archaeological excavations, the creation of national parks and the development of tourist activities are other ways that Israel ensures control over Palestinian land.

16. East Jerusalem is particularly affected by such developments (A/70/351, paras. 25-51). At the time of writing, significant plans were pending at various administrative stages, such as the projected parks in Issawiya and in Silwan's Al-Bustan. Seizing orders for the national park on Mount Scopus were issued by the municipality for landscaping purposes in July 2015.[24] The most significant development pertains to the Kedem Compound in Silwan, a major tourist site promoted by the Elad settler organization. In March 2016, the full committee of the National Planning Council issued its formal decision, revoking the June 2015 ruling of the Appeals Committee to reduce the size of the original plans by half. The positive results achieved in 2015 (A/HRC/31/43, para. 19), on the basis of objections from Silwan's residents, NGOs, architects and various planning and conservation experts, have therefore been reversed and the original plan restored as approved by the District Committee in 2014.[25]

17. The full plan for the Kedem Compound foresees the construction of a massive structure of 16,000 square metres that may be at odds with the construction criteria within a national park.[8] Besides its significant impact on the lives of Palestinians in Silwan, the implementation of the plan would represent a milestone in changing the status quo and character of East Jerusalem.

F. Settler violence and law enforcement

18. Between 1 June 2015 and 31 May 2016, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs registered 175 incidents of settler violence against Palestinians resulting in injuries (81) or property damage (94), with a distinct peak (57 reported incidents) in October 2015 and a noticeable decrease in incidents to date in 2016 (38 incidents during the first five months). Some attacks have featured an exceptional degree of violence, such as the arson attack against the Dawabsheh family home in Duma on 31 July 2015 that took the life of an 18-month-old child and his parents (A/HRC/31/43, paras. 35 and 36). In the aftermath of the attack, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs stated that "such violence is possible

[22] Planning and construction law proposal (amendment — enforcement of administrative demolition order) of 2016 introduced by Micky Zohar of the Likud party.

[23] Both bills appear to be motivated by a number of impending deadlines, imposed by the High Court of Justice, for the evacuation of unauthorized settlement construction, including the outpost of Amona.

[24] Nir Hasson, "Palestinians say Jerusalem council trying to turn Mount Scopus into park", *Haaretz*, 5 July 2015.

[25] The decision is currently being challenged on the grounds that it may be politically motivated. See Nir Hasson, "Settler groups asks High Court to cover up its ties to Israeli Justice Minister", *Haaretz*, 23 June 2016.

because of the environment created as a result of Israel's decades-long policy of illegal settlement activities".[26]

19. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reiterated his concern regarding Israel's failure to enforce the law against violent settlers (A/HRC/25/38, paras. 42 and 43). Figures published by the Israeli Ministry of Justice in January 2016 suggest an increasing indictment rate for ideologically motivated offences by Israelis against Palestinians.[27] Nevertheless, according to a recent report by the Israeli NGO Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights on law enforcement on Israeli citizens, only 7.3 per cent of complaints of ideologically motivated offences against Palestinians that were monitored by the organization between 2005 and 2015 led to an indictment, while 85 per cent of investigations were closed owing to police failures within the investigative process, such as the inability to identify suspects or to collect evidence.[28]

20. Following the arson attack in Duma, Israeli authorities adopted measures, including administrative detention and movement restrictions against settlers, in an effort to prevent further incidents of violence (A/HRC/31/43, paras. 40-43). With respect to administrative detention, the Secretary-General has condemned its use by Israel against Palestinians and Israelis alike. On 3 January 2016, media reported that two Israeli suspects had been indicted with regard to the attack in Duma, one being charged with three counts of murder and the other, a child, as accessory to murder.[29] Welcoming these steps towards accountability, the Secretary-General recalls Israel's duty to respect and ensure the respect of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and calls for prompt and effective investigations in all other cases of alleged settler violence leading to the injury or death of Palestinians, as well as damage to their property.

G. Impact on Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer

21. The impact of settlement expansion on Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer has been highlighted in previous reports of the Secretary-General (A/HRC/31/43, paras. 44-63). The year 2016 began with a dramatic increase in demolitions in Area C. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2016 saw the highest number of structures demolished in a single month since 2009 when the systematic documentation of demolitions began. As at 7 June 2016, a total of 546 structures, including 79 in East Jerusalem, had been demolished since the beginning of the year, more than the total number of demolitions for the whole of 2015 (453 structures, including 78 in East Jerusalem). Some 796 Palestinians have already been displaced by demolitions in

[26] Statement available from: www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-statements/19082015/middleeast.

[27] Ministry of Justice, "Israel's investigation and prosecution of ideologically motivated offences against Palestinians in the West Bank".

[28] See Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights, "Law enforcement on Israeli civilians in the West Bank", data sheet, October 2015. See also Yesh Din's analysis of the Ministry of Justice report on Israel's investigation and prosecution of ideologically motivated offences against Palestinians in the West Bank. Available from: www.rightsecretariat.ps/catigory/item/141-yesh-din-s-analysis-of-moj-report-on-israel-s-investigation-and-prosecution-of-ideologically-motivated-offences-against-palestinians-in-the-west-bank.

[29] Chaim Levinson and Barak Ravid, "Israel charges two Jews over West Bank arson murders", *Haaretz*, 3 January 2016.

2016, compared with 580 in 2015. Since March 2016, the rate of demolitions has decreased significantly.

22. Bedouins living in Area C are the most affected by demolitions and at risk of forcible transfer. Khirbet Tana has suffered four rounds of demolition since the beginning of 2016. On 23 March 2016 alone, 53 structures were demolished in the hamlet, resulting in the displacement of 87 persons.

23. Other Palestinian communities were also affected by demolitions. Preparations for the new settlement on the site of Beit al-Baraka along Route 60, next to the Al-Arroub refugee camp, resulted in the demolition of three agricultural structures and the uprooting of 85 trees. On 12 April 2016, demolitions resumed after a pause of four years in Al-Walaja with three houses demolished. This coincided with the resumption of construction of the wall in the nearby Cremisan Valley and the initiation of works for the planned visitor centre of the Emek Refaim national park located nearby.

24. Hundreds of families are at risk of forcible transfer in East Jerusalem owing to the seizure of numerous buildings by Israeli settlers in Silwan and in the Old City, as well as by the development of various parks throughout East Jerusalem. These facts suggest that there is a close link between the rate of demolitions and forcible evictions and settlement expansion. The following case study on Hebron illustrates how the coercive environment generated by settlements forces Palestinians to relocate to different areas.

IV. Impact of settlements: a case study of Hebron's coercive environment

25. After East Jerusalem, Hebron is the second largest city in the West Bank, with a population of 215,000 inhabitants. Its Old City features a site of high religious significance to Jews and Muslims: the Ibrahimi Mosque, or Tomb of the Patriarchs. Hebron is the only other city within the West Bank, besides East Jerusalem, with Israeli settlements within its urban area. Approximately 600 settlers live in five settlements consisting of one to a few buildings: Avraham Avinu, Beit Romano, Beit Hadassah, Tel Rumeida and Beit al-Rajabi.

26. These settlements are part of the H2 zone, the area of Hebron in which Israel retained all authority and responsibilities for internal security and public order under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[30] H2 covers approximately 20 per cent of Hebron, including the Old City, which was once the centre of commercial and cultural life in Hebron, and includes approximately 40,000 of its inhabitants. In addition to settlements in H2, the zone is surrounded by two large settlements, Kiryat Arba and Givat Ha'avot, with a cumulated settler population of 7,000. To ensure the security of the settlers, an average of 1,500 Israel Defense Forces soldiers have been deployed among 6,000 Palestinians living in adjacent neighbourhoods.

[30] Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995, annex I, art. VII, implemented by the Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron of 21 January 1997.

27. The settlement of Beit al-Rajabi was the latest to be established after the Israeli Supreme Court had ruled in favour of settler ownership of the building in 2014. It is the first new settlement established in the city of Hebron since 1980 (A/69/348, paras. 22 and 23). In April 2012, settlers took over another Palestinian building in H2, the Abu Rajab house, claiming that they had purchased it. They were moved out by the Israel Defense Forces a few days later. The settlers' ownership claim was eventually denied by the Israeli Civil Administration on 28 December 2015.[31] On 20 January 2016, a group of settlers occupied two additional Palestinian houses in the Old City, claiming ownership, before being removed by the soldiers the next day.

28. Since 1994,[32] restricted areas have been established around the five settlements located within H2, covering the main part of the Old City, with several streets prohibited to Palestinian traffic, including some to pedestrian movement. The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron foresees the normalization of life in the Old City, including the reopening of Al-Shuhada Street and the wholesale market, but the commitment has not been met. Hundreds of closures by Israeli security forces or physical obstacles remain in Hebron, including 17 permanently staffed checkpoints. Palestinian land in the vicinity of settlements has also been seized on alleged security grounds. More than 1,800 commercial establishments, accounting for 75 per cent of all businesses in the Old City, have closed, most during the second intifada in the early 2000s, mainly as a result of access restrictions for customers and suppliers or on the basis of military orders. More than 1,000 Palestinian homes, or 42 per cent of homes in the Old City, were abandoned by their residents, the majority during the second intifada.[33] Four mosques were also closed in the Old City. What used to be the commercial and cultural heart of Hebron has now been virtually deserted for almost two decades.

29. The Ibrahimi Mosque (Tomb of the Patriarchs), a site of high religious significance to Jews and Muslims, is located in H2. The site was divided in two parts following the 1994 massacre, one for Muslim worshippers and the other for Jewish worshippers. During major religious holidays and for an average of 10 days a year, the site is open to one faith only. During Jewish holidays, thousands of Israeli visitors converge in Hebron, while the movements of Palestinians in the Old City are strictly limited.[34] The Muslim call for prayer is also banned during those holidays. On other days, because of access restrictions to the location from which it is performed, the call for prayer is prevented twice daily and subject to delays at other times.[35]

30. Archaeological works by Israel and related plans to build a tourist centre in the Tel Rumeida area of H2 was another concerning development. While no major advancement was witnessed, previous reports highlight the significant impact that such a project would have on the Palestinian inhabitants of Tel Rumeida (A/69/348, para. 35, A/HRC/31/43, para. 16).

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[31] Peace Now, "Settlers' ownership claim of a Hebron house rejected by the Civil Administration's Registration Committee", 29 December 2015.

[32] On 25 February 1994, an Israeli settler opened fire on Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque (Tomb of the Patriarchs), killing 29 Palestinians and injuring 125 others.

[33] Ofir Feuerstein, *Ghost Town: Israel's separation policy and forced eviction of Palestinians from the centre of Hebron* (B'tselem and Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2007).

[34] Jews do not face similar practical restrictions during Palestinian holidays.

[35] Data from Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowment (Al-Waqf).

31. The escalation of violence that began in September 2015 had a significant impact on Hebron, further undermining the living conditions of Palestinians in H2, but also general access to the entire city. Besides restrictions on the main roads leading into Hebron, neighbourhoods adjacent to the settlements in H2, or so-called restricted areas, have been isolated further by additional physical obstacles and frequent inspections on individuals. While such measures add to the coercive environment, concern has also been raised that they may result in collective punishment.[36]

32. On 1 November 2015, the part of Al-Shuhada Street still accessible to Palestinians and the neighbourhood of Tel Rumeida were declared a closed military zone, enforced on Palestinians only, to which only residents officially registered with the Israeli authorities could access. Visitors were not allowed into the zone, including friends, family, medical and maintenance personnel and human rights observers. The military zone was officially lifted on 19 May 2016, after more than half a year of isolation for the approximately 120 Palestinian families living in the neighbourhood of Tel Rumeida and Al-Shuhada Street.

33. In addition to being regularly attacked and intimidated by settlers,[37] human rights defenders active in Hebron have also been affected by increasing pressure from the Israeli security forces, including through the latest security measures on restricted areas. International, Palestinian and Israeli human rights defenders, in particular, have been subjected to arrest, intimidation, raids on their offices and death threats. For instance, additional pressure was placed upon volunteers from the International Solidarity Movement after they had witnessed and documented from their premises the killing by the Israel Defense Forces of two Palestinian men in October 2015. On 29 February 2016, the coordinator of the NGO Youth Against Settlements, Issa Amro, was arrested by security forces for his involvement in the organization of a peaceful demonstration to open Al-Shuhada Street. He was released the next day and reported having been ill-treated in detention.[38]

A. Impact on specific human rights

34. The extraterritorial applicability of human rights law has been recognized by the International Court of Justice and human rights treaty bodies.[39] Accordingly, Israel has the duty to implement its human rights obligations within the Occupied Palestinian Territory with regard to not only Israeli citizens, but also the entire Palestinian population. It has the obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute, punish and remedy harm sustained by the Palestinians in H2, irrespective of whether such harm is caused by officials or individuals, and without any discrimination.

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[36] B'tselem, "New restrictions on movement in Hebron and environs disrupt lives and constitute prohibited collective punishment", 5 November 2015.

[37] A/HRC/31/43, paras. 38 and 39. See also International Solidarity Movement, "Notorious violent criminal settler Anat Cohen assaults and terrorizes internationals again", 27 October 2015.

[38] Youth against Settlements, "Human rights defender, Issa Amro, released after another arrest by Israeli forces", 3 March 2016. Available from: http://hyas.ps/press-release-israeli-soldiers-arrest-human-rights-defender-issa-amro-hold-him-for-24-hours/.

[39] International Court of Justice, Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion of 9 July 2004, paras. 110-112. See also A/HRC/25/38, para. 5, and A/69/348.

35. The present section focuses on the impact of the settlements on specific human rights of the Palestinian population living in H2. Besides direct effects, such as settler violence and limitations on freedom of movement, the large numbers of Israeli security forces in and around H2 to ensure the security of settlers carries an important risk of violations.

B. Right to life, liberty and security of person

Excessive use of force and denial of medical assistance

36. The escalation of violence during the last quarter of 2015 was preceded by the killing of 18-year-old Hadeel al-Hashlamoun by the Israel Defense Forces. She allegedly attempted an attack with a knife at a checkpoint in the Old City of Hebron on 22 September 2015. More than eight months after the incident, no criminal investigation appears to have been opened, even though an inquiry by the Forces had concluded that the death was unnecessary and avoidable (A/HRC/31/40, paras. 11-13).

37. Ms. Al-Hashlamoun's killing was the first in a series of incidents in which Palestinians were killed or seriously injured by Israeli security forces around the numerous checkpoints within or leading to H2 while carrying out or allegedly carrying out an attack against Israelis. A total of 24 Palestinians, including 7 children, 2 women and 1 girl, were shot and killed by the security forces during such attacks or alleged attacks. One Palestinian man was killed during clashes. Since the upsurge in violence in September 2015, this is the highest number of Palestinian casualties in a single city, after East Jerusalem.

38. On 24 March 2016, the Israel Defense Forces killed Abdelfattah al-Sharif and Ramzi al-Qasrawi during an alleged stabbing attack against an Israeli soldier in Tel Rumeida. A videotape recorded by a witness and widely circulated in the media shows a soldier shooting Mr. Al-Sharif in the head at close range, while he was lying, apparently wounded but still alive, on the ground, even though he seemed not to pose any immediate threat.[40] He had received no medical treatment from nearby medical staff after his initial injury. The recording of the incident was shared around the world on social media. The Israeli police immediately opened an investigation. Both the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights strongly condemned the "apparent extrajudicial execution".[41] Additional witness accounts emerged suggesting that Mr. Al-Qasrawi, the second Palestinian man involved in the incident, might also have been subject to an extrajudicial execution, given that he was shot in the head while lying wounded on the ground.[42]

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[40] See www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8WK2TgruMo.

[41] Nikolay Mladenov, United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, statement on the apparent extra-judicial execution of a Palestinian assailant in Hebron in the occupied West Bank, 25 March 2016. Available from: ww.unsco.org/Documents/Statements/SC/2016/Statement%20by%20UN%20Special%20Coordinator%20Mladenov%20-%2025%20March%202016.pdf, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Comment by the spokesperson for OHCHR, Rupert Colville, on the killing of a Palestinian man in Hebron", 30 March 2016.

[42] B'tselem, "Testimonies: prior to incident for which Elor Azaria is facing charges, Ramzi al-Qasrawi was also executed", press release, 6 June 2016.

39. On 13 February 2016, Kilzar Eweiwi, an 18-year-old Palestinian woman, reportedly attacked an Israeli soldier with a knife while he was searching her bag at a checkpoint in the Old City. After having lightly injured the soldier, she stabbed a Palestinian bystander while running away into a dead-end yard, with no means to escape. There, according to the injured bystander, two soldiers shot at vital parts of her body with several bullets from a distance of 5 or 6 metres. An eyewitness told the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that she was left wounded without medical assistance for approximately 30 minutes before being declared dead.

40. On 25 October 2015, Dania Irshied, a 17-year-old Palestinian girl, was shot and killed by the Israel Defense Forces at the checkpoint leading to the Ibrahimi Mosque. A witness told OHCHR that, after searching the girl's bag, a soldier began shouting at her, repeatedly ordering her to reveal the knife that he alleged she was hiding. The girl continually denied that she was carrying a knife but was shot with several bullets in the upper part of her body while allegedly holding her empty hands in the air. According to witnesses, Ms. Irshied was reportedly left wounded on the ground without medical assistance for approximately 25 minutes. She died at the scene.

41. Similarly, on 26 October 2015, 20-year-old Sa'ad al-Atrash was ki"ed by the Israel Defense Forces at a checkpoint in the Old City for an alleged stabbing attack during what seemed to be a regular identity check. Witnesses reported to OHCHR how a soldier shot at the upper part of his body as Mr. Al-Atrash was handing over his identification. According to those accounts, he was left on the ground without medical assistance for approximately 25 minutes manifestly still alive, despite the nearby presence of an ambulance.

42. On 15 February 2016, 21-year-old Yasmeen al-Zaru was shot by the Israel Defense Forces and critically injured at a checkpoint close to the Ibrahimi Mosque. According to numerous witnesses present at the scene, the soldiers ordered Ms. Al-Zaru to stop once she had already walked through the checkpoint, empty-handed. She was shot in the back by two soldiers from a distance of 6 or 7 metres after apparently ignoring the order. The girl was then left on the ground, bleeding heavily, for approximately 15 minutes. Two witnesses informed OHCHR that an Israeli settler threw a knife near the injured girl while she was on the ground. Ms. Al-Zaru was eventually taken to an Israeli hospital before being arrested on suspicion of an attempted stabbing. At the time of writing, Ms. Al-Zaru was still in prison, but had yet to be indicted.

43. The cases monitored by OHCHR raise serious concerns about the excessive use of force and unlawful killings by the Israeli security forces, including extrajudicial executions (A/HRC/31/40, paras. 10-15). Law enforcement officials, including members of the armed forces acting in that capacity, have the duty to protect the public and the right to protect themselves, but lethal force should only be used when strictly necessary and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. It should be restricted to cases of self-defence or defence of others against an imminent threat of death or serious injury, that is, to situations of last resort.[43] The use of force that does not comply with those principles and results in the death of

[43] Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, articles 2 and 3, and Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, provisions 5, 9, 13 and 14.

the suspect amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of life.[44] In addition, when the unjustified use of firearms by law enforcement officials of the occupying Power is made against protected persons, this may, depending on the circumstances, amount to an act of wilful killing under international humanitarian law.[45] The cases of Dania Irshied, Sa'ad al-Atrash and Yasmeen al-Zaru are all the more disturbing because OHCHR found no evidence that they were killed within the context of a stabbing or attempted stabbing attack.

44. Systematic delays in the provision of medical assistance to wounded suspects, as documented by OHCHR in all the above-mentioned cases, is an additional concern and may suggest the existence of an established practice. According to international legal principles regulating the use of force by law enforcement officials, medical assistance has to be provided as soon as possible.[46] The loss of life resulting from a failure to respect this principle would also amount to an arbitrary deprivation of life.

45. All allegations of the use of excessive force resulting in death or injury by law enforcement officials should be subject to prompt, independent and impartial investigations. The apparent extrajudicial execution of Mr. Al-Sharif is the only known case of killing by the Israeli security forces during the reporting period that has so far led to an indictment. The soldier that fired the fatal shot at Mr. Al-Sharif has been suspended and is currently facing trial for manslaughter in a military court.

Settler violence and lack of accountability

46. Hebron has been the scene of continuous harassment and violence committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinians, including against children, mostly without legal consequences. The close proximity within which the settlers live with Palestinians in H2 makes this violence all the more acute and dangerous. After a notable peak in instances of settler violence in early October 2015 (A/HRC/31/43, para. 38), rates decreased significantly in the subsequent months. While attacks often take the form of stone-throwing, damage to Palestinian property and verbal harassment, the violence of a number of attacks and the inaction of the Israel Defense Forces when present at the scene are particularly worrying, as illustrated by two cases monitored by OHCHR.

47. On 17 October 2015, Fadel Mohammad Awad al-Qawasmeh was shot by an Israeli settler while walking on Al-Shuhada Street after having been searched. According to witnesses, the settler approached Mr. Al-Qawasmeh in a provocative way, yelling at him. When Mr. Al-Qawasmeh turned back to avoid the settler, the latter shot at him with several bullets, including at the upper part of his body. As seen in a video of the incident recorded by Youth Against Settlements,[47] Mr. Al-Qawasmeh was lying wounded on the ground as a number of soldiers converged on the location. The soldiers neither arrested the settler nor assisted Mr. Al-Qawasmeh, who was left wounded for approximately 25 minutes before eventually being evacuated by Israeli medical personnel and pronounced dead.

[44] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6.
[45] Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 147.
[46] Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, provision 5 (c).
[47] See www.youtube.com/watch?v=opdMYUpMny8.

48. On 4 May 2016, Ra'ed Abu Rmeileh, a former cameraman for the NGO B'tselem, was attacked by Israeli settlers close to the Ibrahimi Mosque when he attempted to videotape settlers harassing Palestinian children. Two settlers assaulted Mr. Abu Rmeileh, punching and hitting him on the head with a sealed soda can until he collapsed. Two soldiers present at the scene did not intervene but were reportedly pointing their weapons at nearby Palestinians and towards the victim while he was being beaten. Once the settlers had escaped, the soldiers assisted the wounded man, who was evacuated by a Palestinian ambulance. Mr. Abu Rmeileh filed a complaint with the Israeli police and identified his assailants. He had not received any update on his complaint at the time of writing the present report.

49. Such incidents seem to illustrate soldiers' consistent failure to stop settlers from harassing Palestinians, intervening only in order to protect the settlers and contain the situation.[48] Such discriminatory law enforcement is of strong concern to the Secretary-General.

50. As the occupying Power, Israel is responsible for ensuring public order and safety within the occupied territory.[49] International humanitarian law provides that protected persons are, in all circumstances, entitled to respect for their persons, honour, family rights and religious convictions and practices. They shall be protected against all acts or threats of violence and against insults.[50] Israel also has the obligation under international human rights law to protect the right to life and physical integrity of Palestinians.[51] Settler violence impedes the enjoyment of numerous other human rights by the affected Palestinian population.[52] Israel is obliged to take measures to prevent and address settler violence, given its duty to respect and ensure the respect of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as its obligations as an occupying Power. However, Israel is repeatedly failing in its obligation to do its utmost to investigate cases of settler violence and prosecute perpetrators.

C. Impact on children

51. For many years, the living environment in H2 has been particularly harsh for children. Children attending schools in the vicinity of settlements are affected by strict security measures, including daily searches at checkpoints. Students and teachers of Qurtuba school are regularly prevented from accessing the school through the usual routes because of settler harassment and violence and are

[48] B'tselem, "Footage from Hebron: Israeli military enables 5-day settler attack", 19 October 2015.

[49] The Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907, art. 43. See also Guidelines for Hebron (annex I, art. VII, of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995) and Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron of 21 January 1997, para. 2, and A/67/375, para. 30.

[50] Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 27 (1). See also the Regulations annexes to the Hague Convention, art. 46.

[51] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6.

[52] This includes the right not to be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7), the right to privacy, family and home (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17), the right to an adequate standard of living (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the right to property (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5).

sometimes obliged to seek alternative routes, leading to major delays. It was reported that seven students had dropped out of Al-Ibrahimiya school since October 2015 because of the heightened risks and security measures at the checkpoints and that the school would be empty by now if the Palestinian authorities had allowed students to move to other schools. The principals of both schools reported a decline in academic results during the same period. Children visiting the Al-Saraya kindergarten were escorted by members of the NGO Christian Peacemaker Teams for the entire school year to help them through checkpoints and protect them from settler violence.

52. Palestinian children are particularly vulnerable to settler violence (A/67/375, para. 22). The current situation of children living in H2 reflects a failure by the occupying Power to ensure their well-being and to protect them from physical and mental violence, injury and abuse, as guaranteed by human rights law.[53]

53. OHCHR interviewed a resident whose house in Tel Rumeida overlooks the checkpoint and settlements. She reported a number of attacks by settlers against children as young as eight years of age living in her house, including slapping, spraying with pepper and beating with sticks. The children living in this house, like many other children in the area, are now confined to playing indoors, given that their parents fear that they would be subject to further assaults if they played outside. Settler children are reportedly often equipped with pepper spray, batons or whips when walking through restricted areas. Palestinian families living in those neighbourhoods are also constantly worried about their children having to cross checkpoints, given the risk of being arrested on false allegations made by settlers. Their children have witnessed numerous scenes of violence, including the killing of several Palestinians by the Israel Defense Forces, which adds to their psychological distress and trauma.

54. Eleven-year-old Marwan Mofeed al-Sharabati lives on Al-Shuhada Street, close to the Israel Defense Forces base and settlement of Beit Romano. On 18 September 2015, after he complained to a soldier that his bike had been stolen by a child living in a nearby Israeli settlement, Marwan, reportedly crying out of fear, was forcibly taken to the military base where he found his bicycle. He was later arrested by soldiers on the basis of allegations by settlers that he had thrown stones at them. He was handcuffed, blindfolded, verbally threatened and harassed for an hour before being released. Marwan's father explained to OHCHR that the boy had suffered from nightmares and bed-wetting ever since. The NGO Palestinian Prisoners Club reported the arrest of 117 children in H2 and H1 by the Israeli security forces.

55. Such cases are familiar to the NGO Doctors without Borders, which has been providing psychosocial support to families residing in H2. According to the organization, the vast majority of children residing in Tel Rumeida and Al-Shuhada Street, in particular those that witnessed the killings of Palestinians, are suffering from acute traumatic symptoms, such as fear, irritability and nightmares.

[53] Convention of the Rights of the Child, arts. 3 and 19.

D. Right to health and to an adequate standard of living

56. Adequate access to health services is a serious concern within H2. In addition to Israel's obligations under international human rights law, including the rights to an adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,[54] the Secretary-General recalls Israel's responsibility, as an occupying Power, to ensure proper access to health-care facilities and services to the whole population, without discrimination.[55]

57. In the restricted areas of Tel Rumeida and Al-Shuhada Street, access for Palestinian ambulances is provided after coordination by the International Committee of the Red Cross with the Israeli Civil Administration. However, this system has caused significant delays and Palestinians no longer rely on it for an emergency first response. Instead, the Palestinian ambulance is left at the checkpoint while the medical personnel cross on foot to reach the patient. This can cause life-threatening delays.

58. On 21 December 2015, Hashem Al'Azzeh, a well-known human rights defender, who had a heart condition, lost consciousness in Tel Rumeida after a possible heart attack. His relatives carried him through the checkpoint, where they were delayed for some minutes by Israel Defense Forces security procedures. On the way, Mr. Al'Azzeh was further exposed to tear gas from nearby clashes. He was pronounced dead upon reaching the hospital.

59. The overbearing military presence and security operations, alongside security restrictions imposed on Palestinians, impede their movement and daily activities, including access to basic services. The closure of businesses also creates a challenging environment for H2 residents to maintain their livelihood and an adequate standard of living. Security measures and access restrictions also have considerable consequences on the social life of H2 residents, given that access to visitors is restricted or banned. Israeli building restrictions preventing the extension of houses located close to settlements have also forced new generations of families to relocate to different areas, mainly in H1.

60. Settler violence and a lack of accountability exacerbate the vulnerabilities created by the already dire living conditions in H2. Paradoxically, the absence of regular policing, away from settler incidents, has turned H2 into a safe haven for criminals. Drug trafficking, smuggling and other crimes have flourished in areas suffering from this security gap, adding to the coercive environment that is forcing Palestinian families out of the area.

E. Forced to leave

61. The coercive environment within H2, added to the events of the past eight months, the deteriorating living conditions and the constant feeling of insecurity, have forced families to move out of H2, as recorded by OHCHR.

62. In November 2015, Ra'ed Sider, his wife and six children moved out of the house in Tel Rumeida, where they had lived since 2000, and relocated to H1.

[54] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 11 and 12.

[55] Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 56.

Mr. Sider took this decision mainly out of concern for the safety of his five sons, ranging from 7 to 15 years of age, and the psychological impact that recent events had had on them. Mr. Sider was also concerned for the safety of his eldest son, who had been stopped and harassed by the Israel Defense Forces on a number of occasions. Additional factors influencing his decision included the increasing security measures at checkpoints, constraints on freedom of movement during security incidents, the constant attacks by settlers and the lack of law enforcement. He recalled how relatives visiting during Ramadan in 2014 were stopped and harassed by soldiers and then arrested when his house was raided during the iftar meal. "The atmosphere for living has become unbearable and we cannot stand it anymore. It is about the safety of our children; otherwise, we don't mind sacrificing ourselves," Mr. Sider told OHCHR.[56]

63. OHCHR interviewed another Palestinian from Tel Rumeida, Nidal Salhab, who is planning to leave the area out of concern for the safety of his four boys ranging from 6 to 16 years of age. His eldest son had already moved to H1 after being seriously injured by live fire from the Israel Defense Forces while returning home late at night on 1 December 2015. According to Mr. Salhab, "Restrictions on everyday life activities, the stress around the clock fearing security incidents, concern for the children's well-being and the unpredictable responses of the IDF and settlers have created an extremely uncomfortable atmosphere to live in. Besides, the strict measures imposed by the soldiers manning the checkpoint have become unbearable and have significantly hampered our daily life".[57]

64. The adverse impact of Israeli settlements within the Old City of Hebron on Palestinians' security and standard of living is striking. Palestinians are forced to leave H2 owing to the coercive environment, and the Secretary-General is concerned about possible instances of forcible transfers. As more Palestinian families leave H2, Israeli settlement will likely expand, further adding to the deteriorating living conditions of the remaining Palestinians.

V. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan

65. Illegal settlement expansion in the occupied Syrian Golan continued with the support of the Government of Israel, in violation of Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law, international human rights law and numerous Security Council resolutions.[58] The expansion has reportedly included a building boom in the kibbutz of Merom Golan, the ongoing "farms project" with plans for up to 750 new settler farms in the coming years and Israeli Government public spending plans of hundreds of millions of shekels to increase the population by up to 100,000 settlers by 2020.[59] The Secretary-General notes with particular concern the statement by the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, at a Cabinet meeting held in the occupied Syrian Golan on 17 April 2016 asserting that "the Golan Heights will forever remain in Israel's hands. Israel will never come down from the Golan Heights. The population on the Golan Heights grows year by year; today it

[56] Interview of 5 May 2016.
[57] Interview of 3 May 2016.
[58] See Security Council resolution 497 (1981). See also A/70/351.
[59] Jodi Rudoren, "As Syria reels, Israel looks to expand settlements in Golan Heights" *New York Times*, 2 October 2015. See also A/70/406 para. 12.

numbers approximately 50,000 and there are thousands of families due to join them in the coming years".[60]

66. The Secretary-General draws attention to the Security Council's deep concern over such statements by Israel about the occupied Syrian Golan and reaffirms the validity of resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that, "the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect".

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

67. Israeli settlement activities remain at the core of many human rights violations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The Secretary-General reiterates that Israeli settlements within the Occupied Palestinian Territory are illegal under international law.

68. Israel must implement all relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 497 (1981), and withdraw from territories occupied in 1967. The Israeli authorities must halt and reverse the creation and expansion of illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in the occupied Syrian Golan built in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

69. Israeli authorities must stop issuing plans and tenders and stop retroactively legalizing outposts and other unauthorized constructions. They must also halt expanding the area effectively occupied by settlements by other means, such as the development of archaeological and tourist parks. The Israeli authorities must also discontinue their support for private settler organizations' initiatives aimed at the seizure of Palestinian properties and the forced eviction of their residents.

70. The Israeli authorities must cease discriminatory and unlawful planning processes in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. More specifically, Israel must refrain from implementing evictions and demolition orders on the basis of discriminatory and illegal planning policies, laws and practices that may lead to forcible transfer.

71. Israel must respect human rights law within the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In view of its obligation to maintain internal security and public order in the West Bank, Israel must ensure proper enforcement of the law without discrimination, including against settlers who commit acts of violence against Palestinians. The Secretary-General reiterates that the Israeli authorities must ensure full criminal accountability for perpetrators of such acts. In addition, Israel must take all feasible measures to prevent such violence and fulfil its international obligations to provide effective remedy for victims.

72. Israel must protect the Palestinian population from arbitrary deprivation of life. Any suspected case of excessive use of force by law enforcement officials must be properly investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted. According to human rights obligations, Israel must also ensure proper access to health care,

[60] Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet communique, 17 April 2016. Available from: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2016/Pages/Cabinet-communique-17-April-2016.aspx.

education and an adequate standard of living to Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The coercive environment that results from the lack of respect for human rights is a factor that has forced Palestinian families to relocate, as has been the case in the Old City of Hebron.

73. **Displacement and relocation to alternative residential areas, as a result of demolition orders, forced eviction or a coercive environment, may amount to forcible transfer, in violation of Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.**